Policy development to support ecosystem services on pasture systems in Saskatchewan by Ingram, Shawn 1993-
	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy	development	to	support	ecosystem	services	on	pasture	systems	in	
Saskatchewan		A	Thesis	Submitted	to	the	College	of	Graduate	and	Postdoctoral	Studies	In	Partial	Fulfillment	of	the	Requirements	For	the	Degree	of	Masters	of	Science	In	the	Department	of	Agricultural	and	Resource	Economics	University	of	Saskatchewan	Saskatoon		By		Shawn	Ingram				
©	Copyright	Shawn	Ingram,	September	2018.	All	rights	reserved.
	i	
Permission	to	Use		In	presenting	this	thesis	in	partial	fulfillment	of	the	requirements	for	a	Postgraduate	degree	from	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	I	agree	that	the	Libraries	of	this	University	may	make	it	freely	available	for	inspection.	I	further	agree	that	permission	for	copying	of	this	thesis	in	any	manner,	in	whole	or	in	part,	for	scholarly	purposes	may	be	granted	by	the	professor	or	professors	who	supervised	my	thesis	work	or,	in	their	absence,	by	the	Head	of	the	Department	or	the	Dean	of	the	College	in	which	my	thesis	work	was	done.	It	is	understood	that	any	copying	or	publication	or	use	of	this	thesis	or	parts	thereof	for	financial	gain	shall	not	be	allowed	without	my	written	permission.	It	is	also	understood	that	due	recognition	shall	be	given	to	me	and	to	the	University	of	Saskatchewan	in	any	scholarly	use	which	may	be	made	of	any	material	in	my	thesis.		
Disclaimer		Reference	in	this	thesis	to	any	specific	commercial	products,	process,	or	service	by	trade	name,	trademark,	manufacturer,	or	otherwise,	does	not	constitute	or	imply	its	endorsement,	recommendation,	or	favoring	by	the	University	of	Saskatchewan.	The	views	and	opinions	of	the	author	expressed	herein	do	not	state	or	reflect	those	of	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	and	shall	not	be	used	for	advertising	or	product	endorsement	purposes.			Requests	for	permission	to	copy	or	to	make	other	uses	of	materials	in	this	thesis/dissertation	in	whole	or	part	should	be	addressed	to:			Head	of	the	Department	of	Agricultural	and	Resource	Economics		University	of	Saskatchewan	Room	3D34,	Agriculture	Building	51	Campus	Drive		Saskatoon,	Saskatchewan	S7N	5A8		Canada			OR			Dean		College	of	Graduate	Studies	and	Postdoctoral	Studies	University	of	Saskatchewan		Room	116,	Thorvaldson	Building	110	Science	Place	Saskatoon,	Saskatchewan	S7N	5C9		Canada	
	ii	
Abstract		The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	investigate	acceptable	and	cost-effective	policy	tools	to	increase	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands.	Due	to	the	voluntary	nature	of	grassland	conservation	programs,	these	programs	are	only	effective	at	increasing	ecosystem	services	and	environmental	quality	if	private	ranchers	and	landowners	find	the	programs	acceptable	and	opt-in	to	the	programs.	Therefore	the	goal	of	this	thesis	is	to	investigate	acceptable	policy	parameters,	including	a	cost-effective	economic	incentive	to	support	producer	participation,	to	aid	in	the	development	of	potential	grassland	conservation	programs.	To	accomplish	this	a	survey	was	developed	and	administered	to	Saskatchewan	ranchers	to	examine	their	opinions	and	attitudes	regarding	policy	structures,	ecosystem	services,	grassland	management	practices,	and	opportunity	costs	related	to	participating	in	conservation	programs.	An	interval	estimation	approach	was	used	to	estimate	the	mean	and	median	willingness-to-accept	(WTA)	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	for	an	acceptable	participation	incentive	to	compensate	for	a	10%	loss	in	opportunity	costs	from	participating	in	a	conservation	program.	The	results	indicated	that	the	mean	WTA	among	the	sample	population	for	participating	in	a	conservation	program	and	incurring	a	10%	loss	in	opportunity	costs	was	between	$34.83	and	$42.58	per	acre.	Extrapolating	these	results	suggest	that	the	mean	WTA	per	1%	increase	in	opportunity	costs	incurred	was	between	$3.48	and	$4.26	per	acre	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	Additional	results	and	findings	from	the	survey	that	could	also	aid	in	policy	development	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	are	also	presented	in	the	thesis.				
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1.	Introduction		
	 Grasslands	provide	a	wide	variety	of	benefits	to	private	ranchers	and	the	public	including	forage	for	livestock,	carbon	sequestration	and	climate	regulation,	biodiversity	and	wildlife	habitat,	water	and	air	quality,	pest	and	disease	control,	nutrient	cycling,	wetland	preservation,	and	aesthetic	value	(Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007;	Kulshreshtha	et	al.,	2008).	These	public	and	private	benefits	are	often	related	to	the	ecosystem	services	produced	on	grasslands.	Ecosystem	services	represent	the	benefits	people	obtain	from	natural	ecosystems	or	environments	such	as	grasslands,	and	have	been	organized	into	four	categories:	provisioning	services,	which	are	the	products	obtained	from	ecosystems;	regulating	services,	benefits	such	as	water	and	air	quality	that	society	obtains	from	regulating	ecosystem	processes;	cultural	services	that	are	typically	non-market	and	non-material	benefits	such	as	aesthetic,	spiritual,	and	historical	values;	and	supporting	services	such	as	nutrient	cycling	and	pollination	that	allow	ecosystems	to	provide	other	services,	for	example	food	supply	(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005).	While	measuring	the	economic	value	of	ecosystem	services	in	monetary	terms	can	be	difficult,	society	undoubtedly	benefits	greatly	from	these	services.	For	example,	a	study	by	the	Saskatchewan	Forage	Council	(2010)	found	that	the	direct	economic	value	of	forages	in	Saskatchewan	was	approximately	$740.4	million	annually,	while	the	indirect	benefits,	which	include	the	value	of	ecosystem	services,	were	valued	between	$894.5	million	and	$1.9	billion	annually.			 However,	several	ecosystem	services	provided	by	grasslands	can	be	characterized	as	public	goods,	meaning	they	are	non-rival	and	non-excludable	in	their	use	and	consumption	(Popescu	and	Hrestic,	2013).	Non-rival	implies	that	one	individual’s	use	or	consumption	of	a	good	or	service	does	not	constrain	the	use	of	the	good	or	service	by	others,	and	non-excludable	means	that	once	made	available	consumers	cannot	be	prevented	from	accessing	or	enjoying	the	benefit	of	the	good	or	service.	An	example	in	the	context	of	grasslands	could	be	air	quality,	as	one	individual	breathing	clean	air	does	not	prevent	another	from	doing	so	
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(non-rival),	and	no	one	can	exclude	others	from	breathing	the	air	(non-excludable).	Consumers	generally	benefit	freely	from	public	goods	because	of	these	characteristics	since	it	is	difficult	for	the	private	sector	to	charge	those	who	benefit	and	to	exclude	those	who	do	not	pay	(Batina	and	Ihori,	2005).	This	is	the	case	for	many	grassland	ecosystem	services:	there	are	no	representative	markets	for	many	of	the	ecosystem	services	so	private	landowners	have	limited	financial	incentives	to	produce	them.	Without	these	representative	markets,	grassland	landowners	might	undersupply	ecosystem	services	relative	to	the	socially	optimal	level	in	favor	of	producing	outputs	that	do	have	representative	prices	and	contribute	to	their	profits	(Ribaudo	et	al.,	2010).				 When	a	market	misallocates	resources	to	a	point	that	a	good	or	service	is	under	or	oversupplied	relative	to	its	socially	efficient	level,	there	is	a	market	failure	and	justification	for	some	type	of	market	intervention	(Tietenberg	and	Lewis,	2014).	It	has	been	acknowledged	that	economic	incentives	or	some	form	of	government	or	market	intervention	could	be	required	to	increase	the	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	private	grasslands	to	reach	a	socially	desired	output	(Gao	et	al.,	2016;	Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007;	Kemp	et	al.,	2013;	Klimek	et	al.,	2007;	Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007;	Narloch	et	al.,	2011;	Ribaudo	et	al.,	2010).	Therefore,	the	challenge	facing	policymakers	is	to	design	policies	or	programs	that	balance	the	environmental	needs	of	the	public	with	the	needs	of	the	landowner	to	generate	income	and	make	a	living	off	the	grassland	(Kemp	et	al.,	2013).	Several	policy	measures	have	been	introduced	to	encourage	private	grassland	landowners	to	adopt	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services.	The	most	common	method	is	to	offer	landowners	economic	incentives	for	producing	ecosystem	services,	therefore	addressing	the	price	signal	problem	and	making	producing	ecosystem	services	a	more	financially	viable	option	for	landowners.	For	example,	agri-environmental	schemes	(AES)	are	offered	in	Europe	to	encourage	the	production	of	ecosystem	services.	The	European	Commission	(2017)	describes	AESs	as,	“payments	to	farmers	who	subscribe,	on	a	voluntary	basis,	to	environmental	commitments	related	to	the	preservation	of	the	environment	and	maintaining	the	countryside.”	AES	payments	are	therefore	designed	to	encourage	farmers	to	adopt	agricultural	practices	or	levels	of	production	intensity	that	will	result	in	desirable	environmental	outcomes,	such	as	the	increased	production	of	ecosystem	
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services,	even	though	these	management	practices	may	not	generate	the	most	revenue	for	the	farmer	(European	Commission,	2017).		AESs	and	other	conservation	programs	have	become	an	increasingly	important	policy	tool	as	governments	aim	to	boost	the	environmental	quality	of	agricultural	land	amidst	growing	social	concern	regarding	sustainability	and	climate	change	(Ruto	and	Garrod,	2009).	This	holds	true	in	Canada,	where	Beneficial	Management	Practice	(BMP)	programs	are	available	in	all	provinces	as	a	shared	federal-provincial	initiative	to	encourage	the	adoption	of	BMPs	and	to	support	environmental	quality.	BMPs	are	defined	as	any	agricultural	management	practice	that	ensures	the	long-term	health	of	land	resources	for	agricultural	production,	positively	impacts	the	long-term	economic	and	environmental	viability	of	agricultural	production,	and/or	minimizes	negative	impacts	to	the	environment	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2018a).	In	Saskatchewan	the	provincial	government	mostly	uses	cost-share	programs	to	promote	BMPs.	In	these	programs	the	government	covers	a	portion	of	approved	costs	farmers	must	undertake	to	voluntarily	implement	management	practices	that	are	designed	to	improve	or	maintain	environmental	quality	and	ecosystem	services	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017a).	Alberta	has	similar	environmental	programs	that	involve	the	government	providing	cost	share	support	to	farmers	for	implementing	environmentally	friendly	management	practices,	while	also	offering	extension	programs	designed	to	provide	farmers	with	a	better	understanding	of	how	certain	management	practices	might	improve	ecosystem	services	and	grassland	productivity	(Alberta	Agriculture	and	Forestry,	2017).	The	Canadian	government	has	also	partnered	with	private	stakeholders	to	form	conservation	organizations	such	as	the	South	of	the	Divide	Conservation	Action	Program	(SODCAP)	Inc.	that	support	and	develop	conservation	programs.	For	example,	SODCAP	Inc.	delivers	programs	that	provide	funding	to	ranchers	and	farmers	in	Southwest	Saskatchewan	to	adopt	environmentally	friendly	management	practices,	and	has	also	attempted	to	introduce	other	programs,	including	results-based	agreements	and	grass	banking,	designed	to	increase	ecosystem	services	(SODCAP	Inc.,	2015).	The	2016	Canadian	Census	of	Agriculture	reported	over	4.8	million	acres	of	tame	or	seeded	pasture	and	over	11.2	million	acres	of	native	pastureland	within	Saskatchewan,	totaling	over	16	million	acres	of	pastureland	in	the	province	(Statistics	Canada,	2016).	The	
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typical	ownership	and	management	structure	of	Saskatchewan	grasslands	consists	of	titled	lands	that	are	privately	owned	and	managed,	land	rented	or	leased	from	one	private	user	to	another,	land	leased	from	the	Saskatchewan	government	to	private	users,	and	public	pastures	that	are	owned	and	managed	by	the	provincial	or	federal	government	and	rented	out	to	pasture	patrons.	However	the	public	pastures	in	Saskatchewan	are	undergoing	significant	changes	in	management	structure,	as	these	pastures	will	no	longer	be	under	government	management	and	are	being	leased	to	former	pasture	patrons	or	other	private	users.	For	example,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	is	offering	patrons	of	former	provincially-owned	pastures	15-year	leases,	and	state	that	all	pastures	will	be	transitioned	from	government	ownership	to	private	leases	by	the	2020	grazing	season	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017b).	This	means	that	there	will	be	a	large	influx	of	privately-managed	grasslands	in	Saskatchewan	by	2020,	and	given	the	public	goods	nature	of	ecosystem	services,	these	services	could	be	undersupplied	on	these	grasslands.	Saskatchewan	grasslands	have	also	been	noted	to	be	one	of	the	most	significantly	modified	ecosystems	in	Canada	due	to	changing	agricultural	practices	as	well	as	oil	and	natural	gas	extraction	(Nasen	et	al.,	2011).	Considering	the	land	use	changes	and	management	changes	occurring	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands,	conservation	programs	could	potentially	be	used	to	encourage	ranchers	to	manage	these	grasslands	in	an	environmentally	friendly	manner	that	can	maintain	sustainable	grassland	ecosystems	into	the	future.	
1.1 Problem	Statement		 There	is	a	potential	market	failure	involving	the	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands.	The	lack	of	economic	incentives	available	to	Saskatchewan	ranchers	to	produce	ecosystem	services	might	result	in	the	underproduction	of	ecosystem	services	relative	to	the	socially	optimal	output.	As	previously	discussed,	several	grassland	ecosystem	services	are	public	goods	for	which	there	are	no	representative	markets	or	prices,	which	could	result	in	the	underproduction	of	these	services.	Further	considering	how	agricultural	land	uses	and	management	practices	impact	grassland	ecosystems,	now	is	an	important	time	to	understand	the	public	benefits	provided	by	grasslands	and	how	land	use	changes	or	changes	in	management	practices	could	affect	these	benefits.	These	issues	
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provide	justification	to	investigate	potential	policy	mechanisms	to	encourage	ranchers	to	adopt	management	practices	that	will	increase	or	maintain	the	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands.		
1.2	Research	Purpose	and	Objectives		 The	voluntary	nature	of	conservation	programs	means	that	producer	participation	is	integral	to	achieving	policy	objectives,	namely	maintaining	or	increasing	ecosystem	services	and	environmental	conservation	(Ruto	and	Garrod,	2009).	Ranchers	must	choose	to	opt	into	the	program,	meaning	that	it	is	important	to	design	a	policy	that	is	appealing	and	provides	sufficient	incentives	to	increase	or	maintain	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	(Sorice	et	al.,	2013).	If	ranchers	do	not	find	the	policy	acceptable	and	choose	not	to	participate,	the	policy	will	be	ineffective	and	will	not	achieve	its	goals.	The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	investigate	acceptable	policy	parameters	for	voluntary	conservation	programs	designed	to	encourage	management	practices	that	promote	or	maintain	ecosystem	services	on	private	grasslands	from	the	perspective	of	ranchers	in	Saskatchewan.		The	primary	objective	of	this	research	is	to	inform	an	acceptable	voluntary	conservation	program	structure	that	will	effectively	promote	ecosystem	services	and	environmental	conservation	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands.	More	specific	research	goals	are	to:		1. Identify	existing	policy	instruments	and	grassland	management	practices	that	increase	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	on	grassland	ecosystems.	This	includes	identifying	how	management	practices	influence	the	degree	of	ecosystem	services	provided	by	grassland	ecosystems.	2. Assess	the	relative	acceptability	of	alternative	policy	instruments	and	key	policy	characteristics	to	ranchers	in	Saskatchewan.	3. Examine	the	opinions	and	attitudes	of	ranchers	regarding	ecosystem	services	and	grassland	management	practices	to	aid	in	policy	development.	4. 	Estimate	an	economic	incentive,	or	price	point,	that	would	incentivize	ranchers	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	
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5. Provide	recommendations	for	policy	design	based	on	the	acceptability	and	cost-effectiveness	of	conservation	programs	designed	to	improve	or	maintain	environmental	quality	on	Saskatchewan	grasslands.	
1.3	Research	Methods		 The	research	will	begin	with	a	thorough	literature	review	of	peer-reviewed	articles,	texts,	and	government	reports	relevant	to	grassland	policy,	alternative	grassland	management	practices,	and	grassland	ecosystems	services.	This	preliminary	research	will	help	identify	how	conservation	programs	and	alternative	management	practices	can	be	used	to	preserve	grasslands	and	increase	ecosystem	services.	A	theoretical	model	will	then	be	developed	to	predict	and	explain	when	utility-maximizing	ranchers	will	participate	in	conservation	programs.	To	assess	the	relative	acceptability	of	potential	policy	instruments	and	producer	attitudes	regarding	ecosystem	services,	the	next	step	will	be	to	design	and	administer	a	survey	directed	towards	ranchers	in	Saskatchewan.	Literature	on	voluntary	conservation	programs	will	inform	the	design	of	the	survey	and	provide	background	information	on	the	main	policy	characteristics	important	to	ranchers.	The	survey	is	used	to	estimate	the	willingness-to-accept	(WTA)	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	that	imposes	opportunity	costs	on	the	program	or	policy	participant.	An	individual’s	WTA	is	the	minimum	amount	of	money	they	are	willing	to	receive	to	lose	a	good	or	incur	some	kind	of	negative	impact,	such	as	a	loss	in	private	benefits	in	the	case	of	this	survey.	The	survey	will	also	ask	ranchers	their	opinions	regarding	alternative	conservation	programs,	policy	characteristics,	ecosystem	services,	and	grassland	management	practices.	The	final	methodological	step	is	to	interpret	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	gathered	via	the	survey	to	make	informed	recommendations	on	policy	structure	that	could	increase	or	maintain	grassland	ecosystem	services	in	Saskatchewan.		
1.4	Thesis	Organization		 Chapter	two	of	the	thesis	provides	a	literature	review	of	grassland	ecosystem	services,	how	alternative	grassland	management	practices	impact	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services,	and	grassland	conservation	policies.	This	review	highlights	the	
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relationship	between	ecosystem	services	and	management	practices	on	grasslands,	providing	justification	for	investigating	potential	policies	to	encourage	the	adoption	of	alternative	management	practices	to	increase	or	maintain	ecosystem	services.	Chapter	three	presents	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	thesis,	including	market	failure	in	grassland	management	and	develops	an	economic	model	to	identify	the	circumstances	under	which	a	profit-maximizing	rancher	would	choose	to	opt	in	to	a	conservation	program.	Chapter	four	outlines	the	analytical	framework	of	how	the	research	will	be	conducted.	This	includes	an	overview	of	the	survey	instrument	and	the	econometric	specifications	used	to	estimate	ranchers’	WTA.	Chapter	five	examines	and	discusses	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	results	of	the	survey,	and	chapter	six	serves	as	the	conclusion	of	the	thesis.																					
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2.	Background	Literature	
2.1	Introduction			
	 Agricultural	production	has	had	to	increase	significantly	over	time	to	meet	the	growing	food	demands	of	an	ever-expanding	global	population.	The	intensification	of	agricultural	practices	has	largely	allowed	society	to	meet	its	growing	demands	for	food	and	has	led	to	substantial	economic	development	as	well,	but	at	a	significant	cost.	The	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment	(2005)	found	that	over	the	past	50	years,	humans	have	altered	ecosystems	more	rapidly	and	extensively	than	in	any	other	equivalent	time	period	in	human	history.	Bennett	(2000)	reviews	how	increases	in	agricultural	production	through	changing	land	use	patterns	and	intensifying	land	use	have	led	to	severe	environmental	consequences	including	the	loss	of	genetic	diversity,	destruction	of	habitats,	and	a	significant	decrease	in	many	lesser-used	crop	species.	This	human	impact	on	ecosystems	has	also	led	to	the	degradation	and	loss	of	natural	environments	and	ecosystem	services	and	has	caused	a	substantial,	and	in	many	cases	irreversible,	loss	in	biodiversity.	Therefore	it	is	important	to	maintain	the	remaining	natural	environments	that	provide	the	ecosystem	services	upon	which	society	depends.		 The	pressure	from	increasing	agricultural	production	has	significantly	impacted	grassland	ecosystems,	many	of	which	are	under	pressure	from	growing	human	populations	and	changing	agricultural	practices.	However,	even	as	grasslands	are	degraded	or	lost	to	changing	land	uses,	they	still	cover	40%	of	the	world’s	land	surface	excluding	Antarctica	and	Greenland,	making	it	one	of	the	largest	ecosystems	in	the	world	(Reynolds,	2005).	These	grasslands	provide	an	abundance	of	ecosystem	services	including	carbon	sequestration,	wildlife	habitat,	water	quality,	air	quality,	and	pollination	among	an	array	of	other	ecosystem	services	(Table	2.1).	As	grasslands	continue	to	be	threatened	from	land	use	changes	and	growing	populations,	for	example,	maintaining	current	grasslands	becomes	increasingly	important	to	ensure	their	long-term	sustainability	and	production	of	the	vital	ecosystem	services	they	provide.		
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Table	2.1:	Grassland	ecosystem	services	(Sources:	Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007;																																	
Kulshreshtha	et	al.,	2008).	
																													Grassland	Ecosystem	Services	
	 	 	Regulating	Services	 Cultural	Services	
	 	 	Carbon	sequestration	 Aesthetic	value	
	 	 	Climate	regulation	 Historical	value	
	 	 	Air	quality	maintenance	 Heritage	value	
	 	 	Water	quality	maintenance		 Recreational	services	
	 	 	Pest	and	disease	control	 		
	 	 			 		
	 	 	Provisioning	Services	 Supporting	Services	
	 	 	Food	and	forage	 Soil	quality	and	formation	
	 	 	Wildlife	habitat	 Soil	conservation	
	 	 	Biodiversity	 Nutrient	cycling	
	 	 	Wetland	preservation	 Pollination	
	 	 	Pharmaceuticals	 		
	 	 			 Grassland	management	practices	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	viability	of	grasslands	and	the	degree	of	ecosystem	services	produced.	Appropriate	ranching	and	grazing	practices	have	been	shown	to	enhance	ecosystem	services,	provide	significant	conservation	value,	and	increase	forage	production,	making	ranching	a	viable	method	for	maintaining	sustainable	grassland	ecosystems	in	the	long-term	(Brunson	and	Huntsinger,	2008;	Kulshreshtha	et	al.,	2008;	Schönbach	et	al.,	2011;	Schuman	et	al.,	2002).	However	grassland	management	practices	can	also	negatively	affect	ecosystem	services.	For	example,	highly	intensive	grazing	practices	and	exceedingly	high	livestock	stocking	rates	can	reduce	ecosystem	services	and	cause	significant	soil	erosion,	reduced	vegetative	cover,	grassland	degradation,	and	reductions	in	water	quality	(Gao	et	al.,	2016;	Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007;	Schönbach	et	al.,	2011;	Ward	et	al.,	2016).	This	suggests	that	there	can	be	both	positive	and	negative	externalities	associated	with	grassland	management	depending	on	the	management	practices	adopted.	Appropriate	management	practices	can	result	in	positive	externalities	by	promoting	ecosystem	services	and	environmental	benefits,	whereas	overgrazing	can	result	in	negative	externalities	by	degrading	environmental	quality	and	decreasing	the	degree	of	ecosystem	services	provided.		
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	 The	grassland	management	practices	landowners	and	ranchers	adopt	have	a	clear	impact	on	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services,	many	of	which	are	outlined	in	Table	2.1.	The	following	three	sections	of	this	chapter	examine	three	essential	ecosystem	services	provided	by	grasslands:	carbon	sequestration,	biodiversity,	and	water	quality.	Each	section	illustrates	the	importance	of	ecosystem	services	and	how	alternative	management	practices	can	increase	or	decrease	the	provision	of	each	service.	The	fifth	section	of	this	chapter	provides	a	literature	review	of	voluntary	environmental	conservation	policies	designed	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	private	grasslands,	which	serves	as	the	background	for	the	analytical	framework	and	methodology	for	this	research.	
2.2	Carbon	Sequestration			 A	key	ecosystem	service	that	grasslands	provide	is	carbon	sequestration	and	storage.	Besides	reducing	fossil	fuel	use	and	developing	low	or	non-carbon	fuels,	Srivastava	et	al.	(2012)	suggest	carbon	sequestration	as	a	major	strategy	for	mitigating	climate	change,	one	of	the	most	urgent	environmental	challenges	the	world	faces	today.	Grasslands	act	as	a	substantial	long-term	carbon	sink	by	sequestering	and	storing	atmospheric	carbon	in	soil	and	plants,	therefore	aiding	in	mitigating	climate	change.	According	to	Follett	and	Reed	(2010),	global	estimates	suggest	that	grazing	lands	account	for	25%	of	the	worldwide	potential	for	carbon	sequestration	in	soils.	Grassland	ecosystems	have	also	been	shown	to	have	a	greater	capacity	to	sequester	and	store	carbon	compared	to	other	agricultural	land	uses.	For	example,	Guo	and	Gifford	(2002)	examined	the	effects	of	agricultural	land	use	changes	on	carbon	stocks	in	the	soil,	and	found	that	carbon	stocks	generally	decreased	when	the	land	use	changed	away	from	a	pasture	system	and	increased	when	the	land	use	changed	toward	a	pasture	system.	Burke	et	al.	(1995)	found	similar	results	where	native	grasslands	fields	had	significantly	more	soil	organic	matter	and	carbon	when	compared	to	cultivated	fields,	further	illustrating	the	relative	potential	of	grasslands	to	help	mitigate	climate	change	through	carbon	sequestration	compared	to	other	agricultural	land	uses.		While	climate	change	mitigation	is	an	important	public	benefit	associated	with	carbon	sequestration,	there	are	several	other	benefits	including	increased	forage	production,	the	maintenance	of	surrounding	water	bodies,	improved	air	quality	and	wildlife	
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habitat,	increased	soil	productivity,	quality,	and	formation,	and	reduced	soil	erosion	that	are	associated	with	increased	levels	of	soil	carbon	(Follett	and	Reed,	2010;	Srivastava	et	al.,	2012).	The	numerous	public	and	private	benefits	related	to	carbon	sequestration	and	increased	soil	carbon	emphasizes	the	importance	of	maintaining	grassland	ecosystems	that	effectively	sequester	and	store	carbon.	While	grasslands	are	evidently	effective	at	sequestering	carbon,	livestock	grazing	practices	can	impact	the	potential	for	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	on	grasslands	both	positively	and	negatively.	For	example,	when	comparing	the	soil	carbon	levels	between	grazed	and	non-grazed	grasslands,	results	have	shown	grazed	grasslands	often	have	higher	soil	carbon	levels	than	non-grazed	grasslands	(Reeder	and	Schuman,	2002;	Schuman	et	al.,	2002).	However,	while	grazing	activity	might	have	a	positive	effect	on	carbon	sequestration	and	storage,	overgrazing	and	high	livestock	stocking	rates	on	pastures	might	diminish	carbon	stocks	(Ward	et	al.,	2016).	A	grassland	pasture	has	been	deemed	overgrazed	when	consumption	rates	of	desirable	plants	and	grass	species	exceed	the	growth	or	recovery	rate	of	those	species	resulting	in	ecosystem	degradation,	declining	aboveground	production	over	time,	and	reduced	environmental	values	(Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007).	Ward	et	al.	(2016)	detected	less	soil	carbon	in	grasslands	that	were	overgrazed	and	intensively	managed	relative	to	land	that	was	lightly	or	intermediately	grazed	and	extensively	managed;	such	results	suggest	that	carbon	stocks	could	decrease	as	grazing	intensity	increases.	For	these	reasons	it	is	commonly	recommended	to	adopt	light	to	moderate	grazing	rates	to	support	carbon	sequestration	and	to	maintain	sustainable	grassland	ecosystems	(Reeder	and	Schuman,	2002;	Schönbach	et	al.,	2011).		 Alternative	management	practices	have	also	been	extensively	researched	to	determine	management	practices	that	can	effectively	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	relative	to	other	management	practices.	The	use	of	nitrogen	fertilizer	has	been	shown	to	enhance	grassland	forage	production,	water-use	efficiency,	and	carbon	sequestration	in	soils,	although	the	production	and	use	of	nitrogen	fertilizer	might	negatively	affect	other	ecosystem	services	(Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007;	Schuman	et	al.,	2002).	Boehm	et	al.	(2004)	identify	complementary	and	rotational	grazing	practices	as	management	techniques	that	can	potentially	enhance	carbon	sequestration	by	reducing	soil	disturbance	and	increasing	plant	biomass	carbon	added	to	the	soil.	Conant	et	al.	(2001)	
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reviewed	results	from	over	100	studies	that	examined	management	practices	intended	to	increase	forage	production	that	could	potentially	increase	soil	carbon	as	well.	Management	practices	included	fertilization,	improved	grazing	management,	conversion	from	cultivation	to	native	grassland	vegetation,	inter-seeding	legumes	with	grasses,	introducing	earthworms,	and	irrigation.	They	found	that	soil	carbon	content	and	concentration	increased	with	one	of	these	improved	management	practices	in	74%	of	the	studies	reviewed.	Mean	soil	carbon	also	increased	under	each	type	of	management	practice.	This	indicates	that	these	practices	might	be	suitable	management	options,	paired	with	appropriate	grazing	practices,	to	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	in	grassland	soils.		 Although	grasslands	have	a	large	capacity	to	sequester	and	store	carbon,	it	is	important	to	note	that	grasslands	might	not	act	as	a	perpetual	carbon	sink.	There	is	a	finite	limit	to	how	much	carbon	can	be	stored	in	grassland	soils	and	once	the	carbon	stock	reaches	the	upper	limit	of	its	storage	capacity,	the	soil	can	only	sequester	as	much	carbon	as	it	releases	(Smith,	2014).	However	improved	management	practices	can	be	adopted	to	increase	the	carbon	sink	capacity	in	grassland	soils,	therefore	increasing	the	upper	limit	of	carbon	that	can	be	sequestered	and	stored	long-term.	This	illustrates	the	importance	of	ensuring	ranchers	adopt	suitable	grassland	management	practices	to	either	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	on	previously	poorly	managed	land	or	maintain	the	carbon	stocks	in	more	well	managed	land	(Smith,	2014).		 Grasslands	are	one	of	the	most	effective	agricultural	land	uses	for	sequestering	and	storing	atmospheric	carbon	(Guo	and	Gifford,	2002;	Burke	et	al.,	1995).	Improved	grassland	management	practices	and	strategies	can	also	be	adopted	to	potentially	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	capacity	in	grassland	soils	to	an	even	greater	degree.	Increasing	carbon	sequestration	in	grassland	soils	provides	an	array	of	private	and	public	benefits	such	as	increased	aboveground	forage	production,	soil	productivity	and	formation,	climate	change	mitigation,	and	other	enhanced	environmental	benefits,	making	it	a	win-win	for	both	the	private	user	and	the	public	(Conant	et	al.,	2001;	Schuman	et	al.,	2002).	Overall,	well-managed	grassland	ecosystems	have	been	shown	to	be	a	reliable,	effective,	and	sustainable	method	for	sequestering	and	storing	atmospheric	carbon	(Follett	and	Reed,	2010;	Gebhart	et	al.,	1994;	Srivastava	et	al,	2012;	Ward	et	al,	2016).	
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2.3	Biodiversity			 As	one	of	the	largest	ecosystems	in	the	world,	grasslands	are	the	natural	habitat	of	many	animal,	bird,	insect,	and	plant	species.	Providing	habitat	to	maintain	viable	populations	of	native	grassland	species,	some	of	which	are	endangered	or	at	risk,	is	essential	to	preserving	a	high	degree	of	biodiversity.	The	management	practices	that	ranchers	adopt	can	impact	the	habitat	of	grassland	species,	and	therefore	the	level	of	biodiversity	present	on	grasslands.	Biodiversity	also	produces	substantial	societal	value	by	providing	vital	environmental	services.	Therefore	maintaining	and	enhancing	biodiversity	through	sustainable	management	practices	is	essential	to	maximizing	public	benefits.		 Humans	derive	a	substantial	amount	of	value	from	biodiversity,	both	economically	and	environmentally.	Pimentel	et	al.	(1997)	reviewed	the	many	services	that	biodiversity	provides	or	aids	in	and	measured	the	economic	and	environmental	benefits	of	several	biodiversity	functions	including	soil	formation,	organic	waste	disposal,	nitrogen	fixation,	crop	and	livestock	genetics,	biological	pest	control,	plant	pollination,	and	pharmaceuticals.		The	authors	estimated	that	the	worldwide	value	of	these	biodiversity-related	benefits	was	$2.928	trillion	in	the	year	of	the	study,	or	approximately	equal	to	11%	of	the	total	worldwide	economy	at	the	time,	illustrating	immense	societal	value.	These	findings	indicate	that	preserving	grassland	ecosystems	is	of	great	importance	to	maintain	the	many	benefits	associated	with	high	levels	of	biodiversity.		 Similar	to	how	livestock	grazing	impacts	carbon	sequestration	and	storage	in	grassland	soils,	livestock	grazing	practices	can	also	impact	biodiversity	in	grassland	ecosystems.	A	variety	of	grazing	or	mowing	management	regimens	can	be	adopted	to	maintain	grasslands	and	support	biodiversity,	but	affects	biodiversity	differently.	Tälle	et	al.	(2016)	compared	the	effects	of	grazing	and	annual	mowing	practices	on	biodiversity	conservation	and	found	that	grazing	generally	had	a	more	positive	effect,	albeit	small	to	moderate,	suggesting	that	grazing	should	be	the	preferred	management	practice	for	conserving	biodiversity	in	most	cases.	Klimek	et	al.	(2007)	came	to	similar	conclusions	analyzing	the	variety	of	plant	species	under	different	management	practices	and	environmental	conditions,	finding	that	plant	species	richness	was	significantly	greater	on	grazed	pastures	than	on	mown	or	mown	then	grazed	pastures.	Based	on	their	results,	
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Klimek	et	al.	(2007)	suggested	that	grazing	at	a	low	stocking	rate	might	be	the	best	management	practice	to	help	conserve	biodiversity	on	grasslands.	These	results,	in	tandem	with	earlier	findings,	suggest	that	proper	grazing	practices	can	have	a	positive	impact	on	both	biodiversity	and	carbon	sequestration	on	grasslands.		 The	literature	also	evaluates	the	effects	of	other	management	practices	on	grassland	biodiversity	and	wildlife	habitat.	One	such	practice	is	fencing	off	stream	banks	and	riparian	areas.	Livestock	with	free	access	to	streams	and	other	water	bodies	can	destroy	wildlife	and	fish	habitat	and	increase	soil	erosion	and	sedimentation.	By	fencing	stream	banks	and	riparian	areas,	livestock	can	be	excluded	from	environmentally	sensitive	areas	and	vegetative	buffer	zones	can	grow	between	the	water	body	and	fence,	which	can	provide	food	and	nesting	areas	for	birds	and	small	animals,	while	also	enhancing	water	quality	and	habitat	for	aquatic	species	by	reducing	erosion	and	nutrient	or	chemical	runoff	(Brittingham	and	DeLong,	1998).	Other	management	practices	that	have	been	suggested	to	enhance	wildlife	habitat	and	biodiversity	include	providing	brush	piles,	controlling	noxious	and	invasive	plants,	tree	shelters,	herbaceous	forest	openings,	nest	boxes	or	other	nesting	structures,	and	wetland	restoration	initiatives	(Brittingham	and	DeLong,	1998).		 Grassland	ecosystems	enhance	biodiversity	by	providing	wildlife	habitat,	including	habitat	for	endangered	and	at	risk	species,	and	land	for	native	vegetation	to	grow,	thereby	maintaining	the	population	of	animal	and	plant	species	(Kulshreshtha	et	al,	2008;	Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007).	Preserving	biodiversity	is	essential	for	maintaining	sustainable	and	functioning	ecosystems	that	humans	depend	on,	including	grasslands	(Pimentel	et	al.,	1997).	However	the	management	practices	that	are	adopted	on	grasslands	can	either	enhance	or	degrade	biodiversity	and	grassland	ecosystems.	There	are	significant	public	benefits	associated	with	maintaining	high	levels	of	biodiversity,	therefore	adopting	management	practices	that	conserve	grassland	ecosystems	and	enhance	biodiversity	can	effectively	maintain	or	increase	these	benefits.	
2.4	Water	Quality		
	 Grassland	ecosystems	play	a	large	role	in	preserving	the	water	quality	of	adjacent	wetlands,	streams,	lakes,	and	groundwater	stocks.	Maintaining	water	quality	is	a	vital	
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ecosystem	service	as	it	provides	drinking	water,	habitat	for	fish	and	aquatic	species,	and	reduces	the	costs	of	treating	contaminated	or	dirty	water	for	public	use	(Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007).	Non-market	valuation	studies	have	shown	that	society	places	significant	value	on	maintaining	high	levels	of	water	quality,	including	within	grassland	ecosystems.	For	example	willingness-to-pay	(WTP)	experiments	are	commonly	used	to	estimate	the	value	society	places	on	ecosystem	services	such	as	water	quality	and	retention.	WTP	refers	to	the	maximum	amount	of	money	that	an	individual	would	be	willing	to	pay	or	give	up	to	receive	a	good	or	prevent	something	undesirable	from	happening,	such	as	pollution.	Pattison	et	al.		(2011)	examined	the	WTP	for	wetland	retention	and	restoration	in	Manitoba,	finding	that	over	a	five-year	period	Manitobans,	on	average,	were	willing	to	pay	between	$296	and	$326	per	household	per	year	depending	on	the	level	of	wetland	maintenance	or	improvement.	Based	on	these	estimates,	the	authors	calculated	the	present	value	of	aggregate	payments	in	Manitoba	for	retaining	wetlands	at	their	current	conditions	to	be	$504	million.	Dias	and	Belcher	(2015)	similarly	estimated	the	WTP	for	wetland	ecosystem	services	in	Saskatchewan.	The	authors	found	that	the	Saskatchewan	public	values	water	quality	the	highest	among	wetland	ecosystem	services	with	a	WTP	of	$104.68	per	household	to	decrease	the	frequency	of	water	boil	advisories,	resulting	in	a	WTP	of	$42.9	million	province	wide.	These	results	demonstrate	the	significant	value	the	public	places	on	wetland	retention	and	restoration,	a	water	quality	service	closely	associated	with	grassland	ecosystems	as	wetlands	are	commonly	located	within	grasslands.		 Management	practices	again	play	a	large	role	in	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	as	grazing	intensity	has	been	shown	to	significantly	impact	water	quality	on	grassland	ecosystems.	Intensively	managed	grasslands	can	contribute	to	soil	erosion	and	diffuse	pollution	rates,	which	leads	to	sediment	and	nutrient	losses	in	soils.	This	can	pose	a	significant	threat	to	receiving	surface	waters	as	suspended	sediments	and	phosphorus	concentrations	have	been	found	to	greatly	exceed	water	quality	guidelines	in	surface	waters	near	intensively	managed	grasslands	(Peukert	et	al.,	2014).	Peukert	et	al.	(2014)	also	estimated	that	annual	erosion	rates,	total	phosphorus	losses,	and	total	carbon	losses	on	intensively	managed	grasslands	were	similar	to	or	exceeded	the	losses	of	other	grasslands,	arable	sites,	or	mixed-use	land.	Many	of	these	nutrient	and	soil	losses	from	erosion	may	carry	pollutants	and	runoff	into	waterways	and	decrease	water	quality.		
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	 Proper	grazing	management	is	important	to	water	quality	preservation,	but	other	management	practices	can	aid	in	maintaining	water	quality	by	reducing	erosion,	runoff,	and	nutrient	loss.	For	example,	pasture	renovation	is	a	management	tool	that	improves	aeration	in	pastures	by	mechanically	puncturing	holes	within	the	soil.	De	Koff	et	al.	(2011)	examined	the	effects	of	conducting	pasture	renovation	before	manure	application	on	forage	production,	soil	erosion,	and	nutrient	runoff	under	different	grassland	soils	and	rainfall	simulations.	Their	results	indicated	that	there	are	significant	and	beneficial	water	retention	changes	from	pasture	renovation,	as	runoff	volumes	were	45%	to	74%	lower	in	seven	of	eight	treatments	and	water	infiltration	rates	increased	in	all	renovated	treatments	compared	to	non-renovated	treatments.	Furthermore,	they	found	that	these	positive	impacts	lasted	up	to	three	months,	minimizing	the	nutrient	runoff	following	manure	application	during	this	time	period	and	reducing	the	adverse	effects	this	runoff	would	have	on	water	quality.	However,	de	Koff	et	al.	(2011)	also	noted	that	pasture	renovation	did	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	forage	yields,	meaning	that	although	the	practice	can	increase	public	benefits	by	maintaining	or	increasing	water	quality,	there	may	be	little	to	no	private	benefits	derived	from	adopting	the	practice.			 Fencing	off	waterways	and	wetlands	can	benefit	water	quality	by	restricting	livestock,	which	reduces	erosion	and	decreases	pollutants	from	entering	the	water,	therefore	maintaining	water	quality	(Brittingham	and	DeLong,	1998).	Livestock	can	be	allowed	limited	access	to	waterways	for	drinking	or	crossing	if	necessary,	but	restricting	livestock	to	a	smaller	section	of	a	water	body	can	help	maintain	the	overall	water	quality	of	the	stream	or	wetland.		 Degradation	and	pollution	of	water	sources	can	cause	human	health	problems,	lower	environmental	quality,	damage	fish	habitat,	and	carry	high	economic	costs	to	clean	and	treat	polluted	water.	Therefore	maintaining	high	levels	of	water	quality	is	an	important	ecosystem	service	that	carries	significant	societal	value.	Since	grassland	management	practices	can	greatly	impact	water	quality,	the	literature	shows	that	the	adoption	of	appropriate	management	practices	can	maintain	and	protect	natural	water	bodies	such	as	streams	and	wetlands.	Preserving	water	quality	on	grasslands	helps	maintain	a	sustainable	ecosystem	and	provides	public	benefits	and	value	in	the	long-term.	
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2.5	Grassland	Conservation	Policy	Review		
	 Conservation	programs	such	as	payments	for	ecosystem	services	(PES)	and	cost-share	programs	have	been	developed	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	by	offering	economic	incentives	to	ranchers	who	adopt	management	practices	that	enhance	environmental	benefits.	Voluntary,	incentive-based	conservation	programs	are	commonly	used	to	support	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	rather	than	imposing	regulatory	policies	that	are	mandatory	and	enforced	by	legal	measures.	Voluntary	conservation	programs	have	the	advantage	of	being	a	consensual	agreement	between	a	landowner	and	governing	group	without	unwanted	costs	or	requirements	being	imposed	on	the	landowner	that	would	be	under	mandatory	regulation	(Segerson,	2013).	Brunson	and	Huntsinger	(2008)	also	note	that	while	ranchers	have	historically	been	hostile	towards	any	form	of	land	control,	regulation,	or	government	involvement,	many	ranchers	have	found	voluntary	programs	and	payments	to	be	acceptable	practices.	Segerson	(2013)	suggests	that	for	a	voluntary	policy	approach	to	be	effective,	it	must	provide	a	sufficiently	strong	participation	incentive	to	the	targeted	population,	in	this	case	grassland	landowners	and	ranchers.	Likewise,	Sorice	et	al.	(2013)	use	agency	theory	to	suggest	the	potential	market	failure	regarding	ecosystem	services	could	be	corrected	if	the	principal,	in	this	case	the	government	or	some	conservation	group,	used	incentives	to	align	the	goals	of	the	agent,	or	landowners,	with	their	own	goals,	namely	increasing	ecosystem	services.	Mettepenningen,	Verspecht,	and	Huylenbroeck	(2009)	further	illustrate	this	principal/agent	exchange	as	the	government	offering	landowners	a	compensation	payment	as	an	incentive	to	voluntarily	produce	environmental	goods	and	services	on	their	land.			 Hanley	et	al.	(2012)	identify	five	policy	design	options	for	promoting	ecosystem	services	on	private	land:	1)	regulation;	2)	uniform	payment	schemes;	3)	conservation	auctions;	4)	conservation	easements;	and	5)	creating	markets	for	ecosystem	services.	All	of	the	above	policy	mechanisms	are	designed	based	on	the	assumption	that	landowners	are	driven	by	profit	maximization,	although	the	authors	also	consider	extension	programs	that	assume	landowners	may	voluntarily	adopt	environmentally	friendly	management	practices,	without	compensation,	if	they	are	provided	with	information	on	these	management	practices.	Hanley	et	al.	(2012)	also	consider	four	key	policy	design	challenges:	1)	paying	for	
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environmental	outcomes,	not	actions;	2)	determining	contract	length	and	other	dynamic	considerations;	3)	spatial	coordination;	and	4)	transaction	costs.	These	policy	design	challenges	are	further	examined	in	the	context	of	voluntary	conservation	programs,	mainly	uniform	payment	schemes.		 The	environmental	effectiveness	of	voluntary	conservation	programs	is	highly	dependent	on	the	uptake	of	the	program	by	eligible	landowners,	ranchers,	and	farmers	(Mettepenningen	et	al.,	2009).	Therefore	designing	a	program	that	landowners	find	acceptable	and	choose	to	participate	in	is	integral	to	the	success	of	any	given	conservation	initiative.	Sorice	et	al.	(2013)	examined	how	program	structure	can	affect	preferences	for	potential	participation	in	conservation	programs	designed	to	protect	at-risk	species.	The	authors	found	programs	that	offered	greater	levels	of	compensation,	supported	landowners’	autonomy	to	make	land	management	decisions,	and	had	shorter	term	contracts	were	more	acceptable	to	landowners	compared	to	programs	that	were	highly	controlling	and	inflexible,	required	permanent	conservations	easements,	or	put	landowners	at	risk	of	further	regulation.	Their	findings	illustrated	that	autonomy	is	a	highly	important	value	held	by	landowners	that	influences	their	willingness	to	participate	in	conservation	programs.	They	also	suggest	that	there	is	a	fundamental	tradeoff	to	be	made	between	maximizing	participation	and	maximizing	conservation	benefits	when	designing	a	voluntary	conservation	incentive	program.	Narloch	et	al.	(2011)	examine	the	potential	tradeoff	between	the	ecological	effectiveness	and	economic	efficiency	of	conservation	programs,	finding	that	increased	management	flexibility	or	higher	compensation	could	increase	participation,	although	these	incentives	may	decrease	the	conservation	benefits	realized	through	the	program.	Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009)	found	similar	results	investigating	farmer	preferences	over	four	main	program	characteristics:	level	of	compensation,	flexibility	over	contract	length,	flexibility	over	land	and	management	decisions,	and	level	of	transaction	costs	measured	in	terms	of	paperwork	needed.	On	average,	their	results	showed	that	farmers	preferred	shorter	length	contracts,	had	a	positive	preference	for	having	flexibility	over	the	land	they	entered	in	the	program	and	over	the	management	practices	they	must	undertake,	and	preferred	lower	levels	of	paperwork.	They	also	argue	that	“farmer	factors”,	such	as	age,	education,	and	farm	size	should	be	taken	into	consideration	along	with	program	or	policy	
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factors	when	examining	farmer	participation	in	conservation	programs.	The	authors	state	that	there	is	a	general	consensus	that	participation	in	conservation	programs	is	positively	influenced	by	farm	size,	education,	and	a	farmer’s	interest	in	conservation,	but	negatively	influenced	by	a	farmer’s	age.	However	farmer	factors	may	be	of	little	interest	to	policymakers	since	they	cannot	control	or	change	these	factors.		 Ruto	and	Garrod’s	(2009)	results	also	indicated	that	higher	levels	of	compensation	could	be	offered	to	induce	participation	in	programs	that	had	longer	contracts,	offered	less	flexibility,	or	required	more	paperwork.	However,	offering	greater	compensation	is	neither	cost-effective	nor	ideal	for	increasing	program	participation.	While	compensation	payments	serve	as	a	strong	participation	incentive,	conservation	programs	are	typically	constrained	by	a	fixed	budget.	Therefore	developing	cost-effective	programs	is	key	to	maximizing	the	environmental	benefits	derived	from	conservation	programs	under	limited	budgets.	Suter	et	al.	(2008)	investigated	landowner	responsiveness	to	monetary	incentives	and	found	that	one	time	payments	offered	at	the	time	of	sign	up	are	a	more	cost-effective	means	of	increasing	enrollment	than	annual	incentive	payments.	Ulber	et	al.	(2011)	argued	that	the	cost-effectiveness	of	conservation	programs	increases	if	payments	to	participants	compensate	their	opportunity	costs,	in	terms	of	foregone	production,	and	no	more.	Babcock	et	al.	(1996)	further	stated	that	to	maximize	environmental	benefits	in	a	cost-effective	manner,	land	with	potentially	high	benefit-to-cost	ratios	should	be	targeted	for	conservation	programs.	If	the	potential	environmental	benefits	are	high	relative	to	the	private	opportunity	costs	of	the	landowner,	more	social	benefits	can	be	realized	relative	to	the	compensation	costs	required	to	enter	the	land	in	a	conservation	program.	Beyond	benefit-cost	targeting,	Claasen	et	al.	(2008)	note	that	a	clear	environmental	objective	needs	to	be	defined,	as	policy	makers	can	then	aim	to	maximize	the	extent	to	which	the	objective	is	met	in	a	cost-effective	manner.	The	environmental	objective	should	be	one	that	is	highly	important	to	both	landowners	and	the	government	(and	society),	as	landowners	may	be	more	willing	to	participate	in	a	program	if	the	program	supports	environmental	benefits	they	value.	Babcock	et	al.	(1996)	discuss	the	importance	of	measuring	environmental	quality	and	the	effects	of	management	decisions	at	a	highly	disaggregate	level,	such	as	individual	fields	rather	than	large	geographical	areas.	Management	practices	that	benefit	one	area	may	
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not	have	as	great	of	an	impact	in	another,	while	environmental	issues	and	opportunity	costs	can	differ	greatly	from	region	to	region.	Weber	(2015)	further	discussed	how	significant	information	deficiencies	might	exist	with	respect	to	environmental	goods	due	to	large	heterogeneities	in	agricultural	land	and	farm	management	practices,	which	can	affect	the	quality	of	the	desired	environmental	outcome	and	opportunity	cost	of	reaching	these	objectives	across	regions.	Therefore	understanding	how	varying	management	practices,	environmental	benefits,	and	opportunity	costs	are	related	across	heterogeneous	regions	is	essential	to	maximizing	environmental	benefits	relative	to	costs	(Claasen	et	al.,	2008).		 Understanding	the	effects	of	transaction	costs	in	environmental	conservation	programs	is	also	a	key	factor	for	developing	effective	policies	(Coggan	et	al.,	2010).	McCann	et	al.	(2005,	p.	530)	define	transaction	costs	in	environmental	policy	as,	“the	resources	used	to	define,	establish,	maintain,	and	transfer	property	rights.”	Policy	makers	must	also	consider	both	public	and	private	transaction	costs	incurred	by	the	government	and	program	participant,	respectively,	when	developing	cost-effective	conservation	programs.	McCann	et	al.	(2005)	list	several	public	transaction	costs	associated	with	administrating	environmental	policies,	including:	1)	research,	information	gathering,	and	analysis	to	define	the	problem;	2)	enactment	of	enabling	legislation;	3)	design	and	implementation	of	the	policy;	4)	support	and	administration	of	the	program;	5)	contracting	costs	such	as	additional	information,	bargaining,	and	decision	costs;	6)	monitoring	and	detection	costs;	and	7)	conflict	resolution	costs	if	lack	of	compliance	is	found.	Private	transaction	costs	incurred	from	conservation	programs	fall	under	three	major	categories:	1)	ex	ante	search	costs,	which	includes	looking	for	information	on	the	program,	comparing	the	program	with	alternatives,	comparing	compensation	to	expected	costs,	and	deciding	whether	or	not	to	participate	in	the	program;	2)	negotiation	costs,	including	application	costs,	meeting	necessary	conditions	to	apply,	administration	costs	of	applying,	and	contacting	program	administrators;	3)	and	ex	post	monitoring/enforcement	costs,	which	could	include	any	monitoring	costs	required	by	the	government	after	they	opt	in	to	the	program	(Mettepenningen	et	al.,	2009).		 Transaction	costs	have	been	shown	to	account	for	a	significant	portion	of	total	policy	costs	and	compensation	payments	in	conservation	programs.	Mettepenningen	et	al.	(2009)	estimated	that	transaction	costs	represented	approximately	15%	of	total	program	related	
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costs	and	about	25%	of	the	compensation	payment	in	conservation	programs.	The	authors	also	indicated	that	foregone	income	and	production	was	the	greatest	cost	factor	landowners	incurred	from	participating	in	a	program	as	it	accounted	for	more	than	50%	of	total	costs.	Coggan,	Whitten,	and	Bennett	(2010)	reviewed	several	studies	on	conservation	programs	and	found	that	public	and	private	transaction	costs	can	account	for	anywhere	between	21%	and	50%	of	total	policy	costs.	Transaction	costs	can	evidently	account	for	a	large	portion	of	the	costs	participants	incur	from	opting	into	a	program,	and	therefore	may	impact	the	likelihood	of	any	given	landowner	participating	in	an	environmental	conservation	program.		
2.6	Conclusion			 There	is	a	clear	relationship	between	management	practices	and	the	ecosystem	services	provided	by	grasslands.	For	example,	adopting	light	to	moderate	grazing	intensity	practices	can	contribute	to	carbon	sequestration,	biodiversity,	water	quality,	and	the	long-term	sustainability	of	grasslands,	while	overgrazing	can	negatively	impact	these	ecosystems	services.	This	highlights	how	the	adoption	of	certain	management	practices	can	maintain	or	increase	the	public	benefits	derived	from	ecosystem	services.	However,	many	grassland	ecosystem	services	could	be	undersupplied	relative	to	what	is	socially	desired	because	private	landowners	receive	little	to	no	financial	incentive	to	provide	them.	Therefore	there	is	reason	to	explore	policy	mechanisms	to	increase	the	level	of	ecosystem	services	and	public	benefits	produced	through	management	practices	within	grassland	ecosystems.		
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3.	Theoretical	Framework	
3.1	Introduction			 Chapter	two	demonstrated	that	ecosystem	services	could	be	increased	through	alternative	grassland	and	ranching	management	practices,	which	can	increase	public	benefits.	However,	adopting	management	practices	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provision	can	often	be	a	costly	endeavor	for	a	landowner,	whether	it	is	explicit	costs	from	adopting	a	practice	or	opportunity	costs	from	foregoing	a	more	profitable	land	use	or	management	option	(Hanley	et	al.,	2012).	Additionally,	some	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services	provide	limited	or	possibly	zero	private	benefits	to	the	landowner	or	manager	adopting	the	practices	(e.g.	de	Koff	et	al.,	2011).	If	a	costly	management	practice	offers	little	in	the	way	of	private	benefits,	it	is	unlikely	that	a	profit	maximizing	individual	will	voluntarily	adopt	the	practice	even	if	it	increases	ecosystem	services	and	public	benefits.	This	section	examines	and	illustrates	decision	making	as	supported	by	economic	theory	that	occurs	under	private	grassland	management.	A	simple	model	is	developed	to	demonstrate	the	conditions	under	which	a	rancher	would	agree	to	participate	in	a	voluntary	conservation	program	and	adopt	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services	and	environmental	benefits.	
3.2	Market	Failure	in	Grassland	Management			 The	private	costs	and	limited	rewards	from	producing	ecosystem	services	can	lead	to	landowners	supplying	fewer	ecosystem	services	than	are	socially	desired.	Ecosystem	services	are	commonly	undersupplied	by	profit-maximizing	individuals	due	to	the	lack	of	financial	reward	for	doing	so	(Ferraro	and	Kiss,	2002).	Without	markets	for	ecosystem	services,	the	supply	of	ecosystem	services	goes	unrewarded	and	those	producing	ecosystem	services	receive	no	direct	financial	benefit	for	doing	so	even	though	society	values	these	services.	This	results	in	an	inefficient	allocation	of	resources	in	that	grassland	landowners	
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and	managers	will	under	produce	ecosystem	services	relative	to	the	amount	that	is	socially	desired	(Ribaudo	et	al.,	2010).		The	underproduction	of	ecosystem	services	relative	to	the	socially	efficient	output	represents	a	market	failure	in	grassland	management.	This	market	failure	is	illustrated	with	a	market	model	(Figure	3.1),	where	MCprivate	and	MBprivate	are	the	private	marginal	cost	and	private	marginal	benefit	of	providing	ecosystem	services	for	a	grassland	landowner	or	manager.	The	marginal	cost	is	upward	sloping	since	the	costs	of	taking	actions	to	increase	the	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	increase	for	any	given	landowner.	For	example,	at	low	levels	of	ecosystem	service	provision	the	landowner	can	make	low-cost	changes	to	management	or	retire	land	that	has	low	productivity	for	agricultural	commodities,	resulting	in	a	low	opportunity	cost.	At	higher	levels	of	ecosystem	service	provision	the	manager	would	need	to	adopt	higher	cost	management	changes	or	give	up	more	highly	productive	land	(Hanley	et	al.,	2012).	As	a	result	the	cost	of	providing	marginal	units	of	ecosystem	services	is	relatively	higher	as	more	ecosystem	services	are	provided.		Conversely,	Private	marginal	benefit	is	downward	sloping	since	the	benefit	of	increasing	the	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	declines	for	private	landowners	as	the	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	increases.	As	noted	by	Follett	and	Reed	(2010)	and	Srivastava	et	al.	(2012),	producing	ecosystem	services	such	as	carbon	sequestration	can	provide	private	benefits.	
	
Figure	3.1:	Graph	illustrating	the	potential	market	failure	in	provision	of	ecosystem	services	on	
grasslands.	
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When	there	is	a	relatively	low	amount	of	ecosystem	service	provision,	changes	in	management	practices	to	increase	provisions	can	have	relatively	large	benefits,	such	as	clean	water	and	improved	soil	and	forage	productivity.	However	as	ecosystem	services	provision	continues	to	increase	the	private	benefits	become	less	significant.	For	example	forage	productivity	and	water	quality	might	only	be	able	to	increase	so	much	before	a	relative	plateau	in	productivity	and	quality	is	reached.	Therefore	the	marginal	benefit	of	increasing	ecosystem	services	decreases	as	the	quantity	of	ecosystem	services	increases.		Combining	the	MCprivate	and	MBprivate	functions	in	the	economic	model	represents	the	private	market	supply	and	demand	for	ecosystem	services	in	grassland	management.	A	private	landowner	or	rancher	will	supply	ecosystem	services	to	the	point	where	the	private	marginal	benefit	of	ecosystem	service	provision	is	equal	to	the	private	marginal	cost.	In	Figure	3.1	this	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	is	denoted	by	Q.	Beyond	this	point	the	private	marginal	cost	of	producing	ecosystem	services	is	greater	than	the	private	marginal	benefit	so	a	landowner	would	incur	a	net	loss	in	welfare	if	they	supplied	ecosystem	service	provision	beyond	Q.	For	example,	a	landowner	could	fence	a	water	body	on	their	land	to	restrict	access	to	livestock	and	create	a	riparian	buffer	zone.	This	management	decision	would	increase	the	landowner’s	marginal	cost	due	to	labour,	materials,	and	management,	and	decrease	their	marginal	benefit	as	they	lose	potential	grazing	land	to	the	riparian	buffer	zone.	Although	marginal	benefit	is	decreasing	and	marginal	cost	is	increasing,	initially	the	marginal	benefit	would	be	greater	than	the	marginal	cost	of	the	management	decision	as	water	quality	could	improve.	The	landowner	would	continue	to	fence	the	water	body	and	expand	the	riparian	zone	until	the	marginal	cost	of	doing	so	was	equal	to	the	marginal	benefit	they	received.	Additional	fencing	or	expansion	of	the	riparian	zone	beyond	this	point	would	result	in	a	net	welfare	loss	for	the	landowner.	While	MBprivate	and	MCprivate	represent	the	demand	and	supply	of	ecosystem	service	provision	for	a	private	landowner,	MBsocial	depicts	the	full	social	demand	for	and	marginal	benefit	of	ecosystem	service	production	on	grasslands.	MBsocial	is	greater	than	MBprivate	because	many	ecosystem	services	provide	positive	externalities	for	which	the	total	benefits	are	not	fully	captured	by	the	private	user.	These	positive	externalities	are	the	public	goods	and	services	discussed	by	Batina	and	Ihori	(2005)	that	often	do	not	have	private	markets	
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and	that	consumers	generally	benefit	freely	from,	and	therefore	provide	limited	private	benefits	to	the	landowner.	Assuming	there	are	no	external	costs	associated	with	the	management	change	in	the	previous	fencing	and	riparian	buffer	zone	example,	in	addition	to	the	private	benefits	society	would	also	benefit	from	the	increase	in	downstream	water	quality,	the	enhanced	riparian	zone	serving	as	habitat	for	wildlife,	a	potential	increase	in	biodiversity,	and	potentially	improved	aesthetic	value.	Therefore	the	social	marginal	benefits	of	ecosystem	service	provision	are	greater	than	the	private	marginal	benefits.	From	a	social	welfare	standpoint,	the	socially	optimal	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	on	private	grasslands	is	the	quantity	where	the	social	marginal	benefit	is	equal	to	the	private	marginal	cost.	The	optimal	social	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	is	at	point	Q*	in	Figure	3.1.	As	Segerson	(2013)	notes,	when	there	is	a	potential	market	failure	unregulated	behavior	might	not	result	in	efficient	resource	allocations	and	socially	desirable	outcomes.	Considering	that	the	social	marginal	benefit	is	greater	than	the	private	marginal	benefit	of	ecosystem	service	provision,	it	follows	that	society	would	desire	a	greater	output	of	ecosystem	services	than	provided	by	the	private	landowner	given	the	same	marginal	cost	of	ecosystem	service	provision.	This	is	evident	in	Figure	3.1	as	Q*	is	greater	than	Q.	The	difference	between	Q*	and	Q	illustrates	that	the	level	of	ecosystem	service	provision	by	the	private	landowner	is	less	than	the	socially	desired	amount,	and	that	social	welfare	would	increase	if	the	quantity	of	ecosystem	service	provision	were	equal	to	Q*.	Therefore	there	is	clear	potential	for	market	failure	in	grassland	management	as	ecosystem	services	could	be	undersupplied	relative	to	the	socially	optimal	output	if	there	is	no	intervention.		
3.3	Conceptual	Model	for	Participating	in	a	Voluntary	Conservation	Program		 The	conceptual	model	used	for	this	research	closely	follows	similar	models	developed	by	Roberts,	Froud,	and	Fraser	(1996)	and	Mewes	et	al.	(2015).	While	there	is	literature	that	argues	ranchers	may	not	prototypically	maximize	profit	(see	Brunson	and	Huntsinger,	2008;	Torell	et	al.,	2001),	I	assume	profit	is	the	only	variable	in	the	rancher’s	utility	function	that	changes	whether	they	choose	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	or	not.	Rancher	i’s	goal	is	to	maximize	his	or	her	utility	function	Ui(πi,Xi),	where	πi	is	the	
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rancher’s	profit	and	Xi	denotes	a	vector	of	individual	characteristics	including	their	attitude	towards	conservation	and	lifestyle	factors	such	as	their	way	of	life,	ability	to	be	their	own	boss	and	live	in	a	rural	area,	and	other	characteristics	related	to	ranching	that	rancher	i	might	gain	utility	from.	A	rancher	will	participate	in	an	environmental	conservation	program	if	their	utility	from	doing	so	is	greater	than,	or	at	least	equal	to,	their	status	quo	condition	of	non-participation.	Subscript	1	is	used	to	denote	a	rancher	who	participates	in	a	conservation	program,	whereas	nonparticipating	ranchers	are	denoted	by	subscript	0.	For	example,	rancher	i’s	utility	from	participating	in	the	program	is	denoted	as	Ui1(πi1,Xi),	whereas	their	utility	from	not	participating	is	denoted	as	Ui0(πi0,Xi).	Therefore,	I	assume	rancher	i	will	participate	in	a	given	conservation	program	if	Ui1(πi1,Xi)	≥	Ui0(πi0,Xi).	The	profit	equations	in	the	utility	functions	for	a	non-participating	and	participating	rancher,	respectively,	are:	πi0	=	pθ0	–	c0L			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.1)	πi1	=	pθ1	–	c1L	–	TC	+	PI		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.2)	PI	denotes	a	participation	incentive,	a	compensation	payment	received	by	the	rancher	for	adopting	management	practices	to	promote	ecosystem	services.	Transaction	costs	(TC)	are	incurred	by	the	rancher	for	participating	in	the	policy,	decreasing	their	total	profits.	Ranch	revenue	is	a	function	of	p,	the	price	per	pound	for	beef	that	is	exogenous,	and	θ0	or	θ1,	the	beef	yield	in	pounds	if	they	do	not	participate	or	do	participate,	respectively.	It	is	assumed	that	θ0	≥	θ1	since	the	status	quo	management	practices	are	assumed	to	maximize	profit	and	beef	production,	and	therefore	participating	in	a	conservation	program	and	undertaking	management	changes	would	decrease	or	maintain	beef	production.	A	price	premium	or	policy	initiative	could	exist	where	p	is	greater	for	beef	produced	within	a	program,	such	as	having	“sustainably	raised	beef”	labeling	and	marketing	for	beef	raised	in	the	program	under	given	management	practices.	However	for	the	purpose	of	this	model,	no	price	premium	is	assumed	to	exist	or	be	offered	to	ranchers	who	participate	in	a	policy	and	p	remains	equal	whether	the	rancher	participates	in	a	program	or	not.	L	represents	the	total	acres	of	land	which	is	equal	whether	the	rancher	participates	or	not,	and	c0	and	c1	are	the	costs	of	beef	production	per	acre	if	they	participate	or	do	not	participate,	respectively.	It	is	also	assumed	that	c1	≥	c0,	since	production	costs	are	expected	to	increase	or	remain	the	same	for	participating	ranchers	from	adopting	alternative	management	practices.	
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	 Rancher	i	will	participate	in	a	conservation	program	if	Ui1(πi1,Xi)	≥	Ui0(πi0,Xi).	Inserting	the	profit	equations	into	the	utility	functions,	rancher	i’s	utility	from	non-participation	and	participation	in	a	conservation	program,	respectively,	are:	Ui0(πi0,Xi)	=	pθ0	–	c0L	+	Xi				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.3)	Ui1(πi1,Xi)	=	pθ1	–	c1L	–	TC	+	PI	+	Xi			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.4)	Assuming	Xi	remains	the	same	if	rancher	i	participates	in	a	conservation	program	or	not,	this	suggests	rancher	i	will	not	participate	in	a	conservation	program	that	decreases	their	profit,	but	will	participate	if	the	policy	leads	to	increases	in,	or	at	the	very	least	maintains,	their	current	profit	level.	Solving	for	PI	in	this	equation	will	define	a	price	point	that	would	serve	as	a	sufficient	participation	incentive	for	rancher	i.	Isolating	PI	in	the	inequality	Ui1	≥	Ui0	gives	 PI	≥	TC	+	p(θ0	–	θ1)	+	L(c1	–	c0).		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.5)	p(θ0	–	θ1)	represents	the	potential	foregone	or	lost	production	from	participating	in	the	policy	compared	to	their	reference	state	of	profit	maximization	without	policy.	L(c1	–	c0)	represents	the	increase	in	costs	a	rancher	could	incur	from	adopting	more	costly	management	practices,	which	could	include	increased	labor,	materials,	or	input	costs	relative	to	their	costs	under	profit	maximization	without	policy	participation.	The	total	opportunity	cost,	denoted	as	δ,	incurred	by	a	rancher	for	participating	in	a	conservation	program	is	the	sum	of	their	foregone	or	lost	production	and	increased	costs,	or	δ	=	p(θ0	–	θ1)	+	L(c1	–	c0).	Therefore,	PI	≥	TC	+	δ	must	hold	for	a	rancher	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	For	any	price	point	where	PI	>	TC	+	δ,	it	is	more	profitable	and	therefore	more	desirable	for	the	rancher	to	participate	in	the	policy	than	to	not	participate.	The	price	point	where	PI	=	TC	+	δ	is	the	indifference	price	where	profits	are	equal	for	the	rancher	whether	they	opt	in	policy	or	not,	so	each	scenario	is	equally	desirable.	Setting	the	participation	incentive	equal	to	the	sum	of	transaction	costs	and	opportunity	costs	is	therefore	the	cost-effective	price	point	to	induce	participation	in	a	conservation	program.		 In	reference	to	Figure	3.1,	the	goal	of	the	participation	incentive	is	to	increase	the	private	marginal	benefit	(MBprivate)	of	ecosystem	service	provision	to	the	point	where	it	is	equal	to	the	social	marginal	benefit	(MBsocial).	If	a	given	landowner’s	private	marginal	benefits	for	providing	ecosystem	services	increase	to	a	point	where	it	equals	the	social	marginal	benefits,	they	will	increase	their	quantity	of	ecosystems	service	provision	from	Q	
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to	Q*.	Therefore,	if	policymakers	understand	the	value	of	the	transaction	costs	and	opportunity	costs	(TC	+	δ)	landowners	would	incur	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provisions	to	the	socially	optimal	output,	the	participation	incentive	could	be	set	equal	to	this	value	(Figure	3.2).	From	the	conceptual	model,	a	participation	incentive	equal	to	the	sum	of	the	opportunity	costs	and	transaction	costs	of	participating	in	a	conservation	program	should	effectively	encourage	landowners	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provision	to	the	socially	optimal	output.		
	
Figure	3.2:	Graph	illustrating	how	a	participation	incentive	can	shift	the	private	marginal	benefit	
of	ecosystem	service	provision.		
3.4	Conclusion			 Many	grassland	ecosystem	services	are	under-provided	relative	to	the	socially	efficient	and	desired	output	due	to	a	lack	of	private	economic	incentives	available	to	the	private	land	manager	or	rancher.	To	increase	provision	of	ecosystem	services,	environmental	policies	and	programs	have	been	developed	to	introduce	incentives,	
Value	of	Ecosystem	Services		
Amount	of	Ecosystem	Services	Provision	Q Q*	
MCprivate	
MBsocial	and	MBprivate	+	PI	
MBprivate	
TC	+	δ	{		
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compensation,	or	rewards	for	ranchers	and	grassland	landowners	for	voluntarily	adopting	management	practices	that	promote	ecosystem	services.	A	rancher	or	landowner	is	more	likely	to	participate	in	an	environmental	conservation	program	if	the	policy	does	not	decrease	their	profits	relative	to	their	reference	state	of	profit	maximization	without	policy.	Therefore	it	is	necessary	to	evaluate	the	opportunity	costs	and	transaction	costs	ranchers	potentially	face	from	participating	in	conservation	programs	in	order	to	develop	cost-effective	policy	tools	that	can	effectively	increase	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands.																									
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4.	Analytical	Framework	
4.1	Introduction			 To	develop	cost-effective	policy	for	increasing	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands,	policymakers	must	understand	the	potential	opportunity	costs	and	transaction	costs	participants	would	incur	from	adopting	alternative	management	practices.	As	demonstrated	with	the	conceptual	framework	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	a	cost-effective	participation	incentive	for	an	environmental	conservation	program	should	equal	the	sum	of	opportunity	costs	and	transaction	costs	incurred	by	potential	participants.	By	understanding	these	costs,	policymakers	can	set	participation	incentives	that	landowners	and	ranchers	will	find	acceptable	to	encourage	the	adoption	of	BMPs.			 This	chapter	outlines	the	research	methods	used	to	conduct	analysis	for	this	project.	This	includes	a	description	of	the	survey	that	was	developed	to	gather	data	on	the	attitudes	and	opinions	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	regarding	conservation	policy,	ecosystem	services,	and	grassland	management	practices.	The	survey	was	also	used	to	assess	the	WTA	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	for	participating	in	a	conservation	program	to	inform	an	acceptable	participation	incentive.	The	survey	area	and	targeted	potential	participants	are	also	discussed,	as	well	as	potential	survey	issues.	The	econometric	specifications	that	were	used	for	the	WTA	estimation	process	are	then	outlined.	The	WTA	estimation	process	serves	as	the	base	of	the	analysis	for	estimating	a	cost-effective	participation	incentive	from	the	conceptual	model	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	
4.2	Rancher	Survey				 To	design	and	implement	environmental	conservation	programs,	policy	makers	require	information	on	the	potential	environmental	benefits	expected	and	the	minimum	level	of	compensation	potential	participants	would	be	willing	to	accept	for	adopting	management	practices	to	achieve	these	benefits	(Claasen,	Cattaneo,	and	Johansson,	2008).	
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While	the	ecosystem	services	literature	review	outlined	potential	environmental	benefits	associated	with	certain	grassland	management	practices,	I	developed	a	survey	to	estimate	Saskatchewan	ranchers’	WTA	for	potentially	increasing	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	their	land.	The	survey	also	aimed	to	identify	rancher	characteristics	and	examine	ranchers’	opinions	on	conservation	programs,	key	policy	components,	ecosystem	services,	and	grassland	management	practices.	
4.2.1	Survey	Description			 The	survey	began	with	a	general	information	section	that	provides	details	on	policy	structures	and	ecosystem	services.	The	question	portion	of	the	survey	is	divided	into	four	sections:	i)	policy;	ii)	ecosystem	services;	iii)	willingness-to-accept;	and	iv)	demographics.	The	complete	survey	instrument	is	provided	in	Appendix	A.		
	 Section	i	examined	participants’	policy	preferences.	Participants	were	asked	to	rank	three	policy	designs	(cost	share	programs,	extension	programs,	and	conservation	easements),	from	most	to	least	preferred.	Participants	were	asked	if	there	were	any	other	policy	structures	they	would	like	to	have	available	to	them	to	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services	on	their	land.	Additionally,	respondents	were	asked	the	minimum	cost	share	percentage	they	would	want	the	government	to	cover	for	them	to	adopt	a	given	management	practice.	This	was	done	via	a	payment	card	question	where	survey	participants	respond	how	likely	they	would	participate	at	each	given	level	of	cost	share.	Additional	policy	related	questions	in	section	i	include	those	designed	to	evaluate	attitudes	to	transaction	costs,	how	many	additional	hours	of	labor	respondents	would	be	willing	to	work	to	adopt	a	given	management	practice,	and	the	maximum	contract	length	they	would	agree	to.		 Section	ii	questions	were	designed	to	reveal	survey	respondents’	attitudes	towards	specific	ecosystem	services	including	carbon	sequestration,	wildlife	habitat,	and	water	quality.		Survey	respondents	were	asked	to	rank	the	ecosystem	services	according	to	which	ecosystem	services	they	believed	provided	the	most	public	benefits	or	were	most	beneficial	to	society.	Survey	respondents	were	also	asked	whether	they	believe	they	are	effectively	providing	these	ecosystem	services	with	their	current	management	practices.	Additional	
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questions	regarding	ecosystem	services	include	whether	respondents	agree	that	landowners,	both	themselves	and	others,	have	a	responsibility	to	manage	their	land	in	a	manner	that	conserves	or	enhances	ecosystem	services,	if	they	would	change	their	management	practices	to	enhance	ecosystem	services,	and	whether	they	believe	the	government	should	compensate	landowners	for	providing	ecosystem	services.			 Section	iii	of	the	survey	estimated	opportunity	costs	of	participating	in	conservation	programs	by	determining	how	much	money	per	acre	each	survey	respondent	would	be	willing	to	accept	to	participate	in	a	given	program.	A	multiple-bounded	payment	card	approach	was	used	to	estimate	the	WTA	of	ranchers	for	decreasing	grazing	intensity	by	10%	on	their	land	to	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services	(Figure	4.1).	A	10%	decrease	in	grazing	intensity	was	chosen	as	the	hypothetical	management	method	to	increase	ecosystem	services	because	low	to	moderate	grazing	intensities	have	been	shown	to	support	ecosystem	services	(see	Klimek	et	al.,	2007;	Reeder	and	Schuman,	2002;	Schönbach	et	al.,	2011)	while	overgrazing	has	been	shown	to	reduce	ecosystem	services	(see	Gao	et	al.,	2016;	Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007;	Schönbach	et	al.,	2011;	Ward	et	al.,	2016).	This	hypothetical	policy	structure	would	decrease	the	negative	externalities	associated	with	overgrazing	and	potentially	increase	the	positive	externalities	associated	with	appropriate	grazing	practices	discussed	in	chapter	two.	The	10%	reduction	in	grazing	intensity	also	provided	a	relatively	clear	way	to	express	that	opportunity	costs	would	be	incurred	from	participating	in	the	program.	Ruijs	et	al.	(2017)	researched	the	opportunity	cost	of	increasing	ecosystem	services	on	agricultural	land	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	finding	that	a	10%	increase	in	carbon	sequestration	only	decreased	agricultural	revenues	by	4%,	while	a	5%	increase	in	biodiversity	decreased	agricultural	revenues	by	13%.	By	choosing	10%	for	the	reduction	in	grazing	intensity,	each	respondent’s	WTA	is	assumed	to	roughly	represent	an	opportunity	cost	of	10%	relative	to	their	status	quo	conditions	from	undergoing	a	change	in	management	practices	and	participating	in	the	program.	The	multiple-bounded	payment	card	approach	presented	participants	with	a	list	of	dollar	values	per	acre	and	asks	if	they	would	be	willing	to	accept	each	amount	in	return	for	decreasing	their	grazing	intensity	by	10%.	The	respondent	was	then	asked	to	provide	the	likelihood	of	acceptance	for	each	value	(Figure	4.1).	After	marking	the	payment	card,	respondents	were	then	asked	open-ended	
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questions	where	they	could	indicate	management	practices	that	they	would	be	willing	to	adopt	to	potentially	increase	each	given	ecosystem	service.		 Section	iv	is	used	to	collect	demographic	information	on	the	survey	respondents	and	their	individual	ranch	operations.	The	demographic	information	is	used	to	quantify	and	examine	the	effects	that	different	farm	and	farmer	characteristics	have	on	other	aspects	of	the	data	collected	in	the	survey.	For	example,	demographic	data	are	used	to	measure	the	impacts	that	different	farmer	and	farm	characteristics	have	on	the	amount	each	survey	respondent	is	willing	to	accept	to	participate	in	a	given	conservation	program.		 It	is	important	to	note	that	all	survey	participant	responses	were	completely	and	fully	anonymous	and	voluntary,	so	respondents	were	under	no	obligation	to	provide	information	regarding	themselves	or	their	ranch.	The	survey	developed	for	this	research	received	an	ethics	exemption	from	the	University	of	Saskatchewan	Behavioural	Research	Ethics	Board	on	September	18,	2017.	The	survey	was	administered	from	November	2017	through	February	2018.		 Payment	Amount	 Definitely	Not		 Probably	Not		 Probably		 Definitely		$1/acre	 	 	 	 	$5/acre	 	 	 	 	$10/acre	 	 	 	 	$20/acre	 	 	 	 	$30/acre	 	 	 	 	$40/acre	 	 	 	 	$50/acre	 	 	 	 	$60/acre	 	 	 	 	$70/acre	 	 	 	 	$80/acre	 	 	 	 	$90/acre	 	 	 	 	$100/acre	 	 	 	 	
Figure	4.1:	Multiple-bounded	payment	card	question	format	to	determine	ranchers’	WTA.		
4.2.2	Survey	Study	Area			 While	the	majority	of	native	grasslands	in	Saskatchewan	are	located	in	the	southwest,	the	targeted	study	area	covered	all	of	Saskatchewan,	as	cattle	are	raised	
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throughout	the	province	on	both	native	grasslands	and	tame	or	seeded	pastures.	There	are	over	11.2	million	acres	of	native	grassland	and	4.8	million	acres	of	tame	or	seeded	pasture	throughout	Saskatchewan,	totaling	over	16	million	acres	of	pastureland	in	the	province	(Statistics	Canada,	2016).		
4.2.3	Survey	Participants				 The	survey	targeted	Saskatchewan	cattle	producers,	although	survey	responses	from	producers	outside	Saskatchewan	were	also	accepted.	The	only	criteria	used	to	identify	and	select	potential	survey	participants	were	if	they	owned	cattle	and	used	pastureland.	For	example,	a	cattle	producer	who	owned	or	operated	a	feedlot	but	did	not	own,	rent,	or	lease	pastureland	would	not	be	targeted.	Survey	respondents	were	asked	how	many	acres	of	land	they	owned	and	rented	or	leased	separately.	Therefore	the	acres	of	grassland	or	pasture	reported	by	survey	respondents	could	be	privately	owned,	rented	or	leased	from	other	private	landowners,	or	leased	from	the	Saskatchewan	government.	According	to	Statistics	Canada	(2016)	there	are	13,497	cattle	farms	in	Saskatchewan	that	reported	a	total	of	2,592,277	cattle	for	an	average	of	192	cattle	per	farm.	This	represents	a	relatively	large	cattle	industry	as	Saskatchewan	farms	the	second	most	cattle	provincially	in	Canada.	
4.2.4	Survey	Administration	and	Data	Collection			 Potential	survey	participants	were	identified	through	Saskatchewan	cattle	breeder	directories	that	had	cattle	producers’	contact	information,	and	in	person	at	cattle	industry	trade	shows	and	conferences	in	Saskatchewan.	Participants	were	typically	informed	about	the	survey	either	in	person	at	the	trade	shows	and	conferences	or	by	email	if	they	were	identified	via	a	breeder	directory.	Surveys	were	conducted	in	person	when	possible,	however	several	surveys	were	conducted	by	phone,	mail,	or	email	when	in	person	meetings	were	not	possible.	When	surveys	were	conducted	in	person	or	by	phone,	the	interviewer	recorded	all	survey	responses	and	comments	by	the	interviewee	on	paper.	If	the	survey	was	sent	out	by	mail	or	email,	the	participant	was	sent	either	a	physical	or	electronic	copy	of	the	survey	that	they	would	send	back	after	completing	the	survey.	Participants	were	also	
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provided	with	the	researcher’s	contact	information	so	if	the	survey	was	not	conducted	in	person	or	by	phone,	they	were	still	able	to	receive	assistance.	
4.3	Econometric	Specifications	for	Estimating	Ranchers’	WTA			 To	estimate	the	mean	and	median	WTA	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers,	I	conducted	an	econometric	estimation	of	WTA	using	data	gathered	from	the	survey.	Following	Broberg	and	Brännlund	(2008)	and	Cameron	and	Huppert	(1989),	an	interval	estimation	approach	is	applied	to	the	WTA	payment	card	data	to	estimate	upper	and	lower	bounds	for	mean	and	median	WTA.	Broberg	and	Brännlund’s	(2008)	expansion	method	for	estimating	double	bounded	data	is	used	where	each	respondent’s	WTA,	the	dependent	variable,	is	bounded	by	the	highest	bid	amount	they	responded	“no”	to	and	the	lowest	bid	amount	they	responded	“yes”	to	in	the	“definitely”	column	(see	Figure	4.1).	To	estimate	the	upper	and	lower	bounds	of	WTA,	two	regressions	were	run:	the	upper	bound	regression	considers	only	“definitely	yes”	responses	on	the	payment	card	as	“yes”	responses,	and	the	lower	bound	regression	considers	both	“definitely	yes”	and	“probably	yes”	responses	as	“yes”	responses.	Therefore	the	WTA	interval	in	the	lower	bound	regression	is	bounded	by	the	highest	“probably	not”	response	and	lowest	“definitely	yes”	response,	while	the	upper	bound	regression	is	bounded	by	the	highest	“probably	yes”	and	lowest	“definitely	yes”	responses.	This	coding	procedure	accounts	for	uncertainty	in	survey	participant’s	responses	by	widening	their	WTA	interval	over	a	larger	range	for	the	lower	bound	regression,	whereas	the	upper	bound	regression	reflects	more	certain	responses.	After	estimating	each	regression,	mean	and	median	WTA	for	each	regression	can	be	calculated	and	serve	as	upper	and	lower	boundaries	where	the	average	minimum	WTA	is	expected	to	fall	within	the	calculated	interval.	Following	Broberg	and	Brännlund	(2008)	and	assuming	that	each	value	on	the	payment	card	represents	a	bid	amount,	Ai,	the	probability	that	survey	respondent	i’s	WTA	is	higher	than	a	given	bid	amount	is:	Pr(“yesi”)	=	1	–	Pr(“noi”)	=	1	–	Pr(WTAi	<	Ai)	 	 	 	 	 (4.1)	
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Each	respondent’s	WTA	is	assumed	to	be	an	exponential	function	of	a	linear	combination	of	observable	individual	characteristics,	Xi,	and	a	normally	distributed	stochastic	error	term,	εi,	with	zero	mean	and	standard	deviation,	σ,	resulting	in:		WTAi	=		𝑒!!!!!! 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.2)	Where B	is	a	vector	of	parameters.	After	substituting	for	WTAi	and	manipulating	the	function,	the	probability	that	a	survey	respondent	accepts	bid	Ai	is	then:	Pr(“yesi”)	=	1	–	Pr(ln(Ai)	–	BXi	>	εi)			 	 	 	 	 	 (4.3)		 Following	the	interval	estimation	approach	utilized	by	Broberg	and	Brännlund	(2008)	and	Cameron	and	Huppert	(1989),	I	define	the	WTA	interval	according	to	the	highest	“no”	bid,	AL,	and	the	lowest	“definitely	yes”	bid,	AU,	which	serve	as	the	lower	and	upper	bounds	of	the	interval,	respectively.	The	minimum	WTA	of	each	participant	then	lies	in	the	interval	AL		<	WTA	≤	AU.	I	then	denote	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	ε	as	F,	and	denote	F(A)	as	the	probability	of	saying	“yes”	to	bid	A	and	1-	F(A)	as	the	probability	of	saying	“no”.	The	probability	that	the	WTA	lies	between	AL	and	AU	is:		P(WTA	>	AL)	–	P(WTA	>	AU)	=	F(AU)	–	F(AL)			 	 	 	 	 (4.4)	The	log	likelihood	is	then:	L	=	 ln[F(!!!! 𝐴!!)− 𝐹(𝐴!!)]			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.5)	Where	N	is	the	number	of	survey	respondents.	Further	assuming	that	the	WTA	function	is	distributed	log-normally,	the	parameter	vector	B	can	be	estimated	and	used	to	calculate	the	median	and	mean	WTA	of	the	survey	sample	according	to	the	following	equations	(Cameron	and	Huppert,	1989):	Median(WTA)	=	e(X’B)				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.6)	
Mean(WTA)	=	𝑒 !!! ! !!! 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.7)	
4.4	Applying	the	Data	Analysis	to	the	Conceptual	Model				 The	econometric	estimation	process	estimates	the	impact	of	rancher	and	farm	characteristics	on	the	expected	WTA	of	individual	ranchers	within	the	sample.	Estimates	for	mean	and	median	WTA	among	survey	respondents	can	also	be	calculated	from	the	econometric	estimates.	In	reference	to	the	conceptual	model	discussed	in	chapter	3,	the	
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lower	and	upper	bound	mean	and	median	WTA	estimates	suggest	a	potential	range	of	values	that	could	serve	as	a	participation	incentive	for	a	grassland	conservation	program.	The	minimum	dollar	amount	per	acre	that	survey	respondents	say	they	are	willing	to	accept	is	assumed	to	be	approximately	equal	to	the	opportunity	costs	they	would	incur	from	participating	in	the	conservation	program.	In	the	survey	the	opportunity	costs	incurred	from	participating	in	the	hypothetical	conservation	program	are	10%	of	the	rancher’s	current	production	level.	Furthermore,	the	WTA	amount	that	each	survey	respondent	reports	is	assumed	to	serve	as	an	adequate	participation	incentive	for	that	given	respondent.	Therefore	the	estimated	mean	and	median	WTA	values	among	survey	respondents	are	assumed	to	represent	a	participation	incentive	that	the	average	rancher	would	accept	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	While	the	survey	assumes	opportunity	costs	are	10%	of	the	rancher’s	current	production	level,	the	WTA	estimation	results	could	potentially	be	extrapolated	to	predict	acceptable	participation	incentives	at	other	levels	of	opportunity	cost	as	well.		 The	mean	and	median	WTA	estimates	function	as	approximate	estimates	for	an	acceptable	conservation	program	participation	incentive	as	noted	in	the	conceptual	model	in	chapter	three.		The	survey	results	will	also	reflect	the	opinions	and	attitudes	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	regarding	ecosystem	services	and	key	policy	characteristics,	ultimately	informing	policy	recommendations	based	on	the	acceptability	and	cost-effectiveness	of	a	potential	conservation	program.	
4.5	Conclusion		
	 The	survey	developed	for	this	project	was	intended	to	gather	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	to	inform	potential	grassland	conservation	policy	development	in	Saskatchewan.	It	also	provided	survey	participants	with	an	opportunity	to	voice	their	opinions	regarding	potential	policies	and	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	that	may	further	inform	potential	policy	development.	The	stated	preference	question	format	of	the	survey	offered	a	simple	and	straightforward	method	for	evaluating	rancher’s	policy	opinions	and	valuations	of	non-market	ecosystem	services.	The	descriptive	and	econometric	results	from	the	survey	provide	insights	for	grassland	conservation	policy	
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design	and	development,	rancher	attitudes	regarding	ecosystem	services	and	grassland	management	practices,	and	estimates	of	WTA	for	potential	economic	incentives.				
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5.	Results	and	Discussion	
5.1	Introduction			 This	chapter	summarizes	and	presents	the	results	from	the	rancher	survey	described	in	chapter	4.	Descriptive	statistics	from	the	survey	are	presented	along	with	a	review	of	common	answers	and	comments	to	open-ended	questions.	Findings	from	the	econometric	analysis	are	then	presented	and	examined	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	overall	results.	
5.2	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Survey	Responses		
	 A	total	of	170	survey	invitations	were	emailed	to	ranchers	whose	email	information	was	retrieved	from	cattle	breeder	directories.	Of	the	170	invitations,	19	surveys	were	completed	via	email,	mail,	or	over	the	phone.	Eleven	more	surveys	were	conducted	in	person	resulting	in	a	17.6%	response	rate	and	a	total	of	30	completed	surveys.			 The	sample	population	average	farm	size	and	number	of	cattle	is	considerably	higher	than	the	Saskatchewan	provincial	farmer	population.	However	the	average	farm	size	reported	in	the	census	of	agriculture	includes	both	crop	and	livestock	farmers	and	counts	all	non-zero	farm	sizes,	so	farms	with	very	little	land	are	still	reported	and	might	suppress	the	provincial	average.	Ranchers	with	very	few	cattle	who	would	be	reported	in	the	census	are	also	less	likely	to	have	information	or	ads	in	breeder	directories	and	therefore	were	less	likely	to	be	contacted	for	the	survey.	Both	average	farm	size	and	number	of	cattle	in	the	sample	population	are	also	influenced	by	a	small	number	of	significantly	large	farms.	This	is	evident	in	Table	5.1	where	the	medians	of	both	variables	in	the	survey	sample	are	more	in	line	with	the	population	averages.		 T-tests	on	cattle	and	land	ownership	reveal	that	neither	variable	is	statistically	different	from	the	population	mean	at	the	1%	significance	level,	while	rented	land	has	no	statistical	difference	at	any	significance	level.	The	percentage	of	survey	participants	with	
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university	degrees	is	also	considerably	higher	than	the	percentage	of	Saskatchewan	farmers	with	degrees	(Table	5.1).	Half	of	the	survey	sample	has	a	university	degree,	whereas	only	7.2%	of	Saskatchewan	farmers	have	a	university	degree	(Statistics	Canada,	2016).	
Table	5.1:	Demographic	information	from	the	survey	sample	and	Saskatchewan	farmer	
population.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	N=30	unless	otherwise	stated.	
Variable	
	
Survey	Sample	 		
Census	Of	
Agriculture	
Cattle	(N=29)	
	
379.8	(378.1)	
	
192	
	 	
Median=275	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	Farm	Sizea	(Acres)	
	 	 	 	Owned	land	
	
2282.7	(2346.8)
	
1171	
	 	
Median=1630	
	 	Rented	or	leased	land	
	
2182.3	(2356.3)	
	
1391	
	 	
Median=	1440	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	Ageb	(%)	
	 	 	 	Under	35	
	
15.0%
	
6.9%	
35	to	54	
	
48.3%	
	
36.8%	
55	and	over	
	
36.7%	
	
56.4%	
	 	 	 	 	Education	(%)	
	 	 	 	No	university	degree	
	
50.0%
	
92.8%	
University	degree	
	
50.0%	
	
7.20%	
	 	 	 	 	Male	(%)	
	
70% 	 86%	
a	the	census	does	not	count	farms	that	report	zero	acres	when	calculating	average	area.	Therefore	to	
be	consistent	with	the	census,	the	survey	mean	and	median	of	rented	or	leased	land	does	not	count	
respondents	who	reported	zero	acres	leased	or	rented,	the	mean	is	only	among	farms	that	reported	
renting	land.	
b	survey	respondents	reported	their	age	in	intervals	different	from	the	intervals	used	in	the	census.	
Uniform	distributions	were	assumed	in	survey	age	groups	to	redefine	survey	age	intervals	equal	to	
those	used	in	the	census.	
(Source:	Statistics	Canada,	2016)	
	
	 	 	There	is	a	slight	difference	in	age	of	the	sample	population	as	the	survey	respondents	are	skewed	younger	than	the	Saskatchewan	farmer	population,	while	a	t-test	for	gender	indicates	that	there	is	no	statistical	difference	between	the	survey	sample	and	population	at	the	5%	significance	level.	The	above	information	suggests	that	there	are	some	statistical	differences	between	the	survey	sample	and	the	Saskatchewan	rancher	population	that	
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should	be	considered	when	interpreting	and	extrapolating	the	results	beyond	the	sample	population.	
5.2.1	Summary	Statistics	of	Survey	Sample			 Demographic	information	on	the	survey	respondents	suggests	that	the	sample	population	contained	ranchers	with	above	average	sized	cattle	operations	who	relied	on	cattle	or	other	farming	activities	for	their	income.	The	average	farm	in	the	survey	sample	had	nearly	380	cattle	and	2,282.4	acres	of	owned	land	used	for	cattle	production,	while	Statistics	Canada	(2016)	reports	the	average	Saskatchewan	cattle	farm	has	192	acres	and	owns	1,171	acres	(Table	5.1).	Over	36%	of	the	survey	population	derived	80%	or	more	of	their	total	income	from	cattle	production,	while	76.7%	of	respondents	received	19%	or	less	of	their	total	income	from	off-farm	employment	(Table	5.2).	This	suggests	that	the	majority	of	the	survey	population	were	full	time	farmers	who	received	little	to	no	income	from	working	off-farm,	and	those	who’s	cattle-based	income	accounted	for	less	of	their	total	income	likely	received	their	income	through	other	farming	activities	such	as	crop	production.		 Grassland	pastures	in	Saskatchewan	that	were	formerly	owned	and	managed	by	either	the	provincial	and	federal	government	will	be	leased	to	private	users	in	the	coming	years,	with	all	provincial	pastures	planning	to	be	transitioned	to	private	leases	by	2020	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017b).	Given	these	changes	in	ownership	and	management,	it	could	be	valuable	to	examine	the	proportion	of	ranchers	who	used	these	pastures	and	the	proportion	of	ranchers	that	plan	to	lease.	As	Table	5.2	shows,	43%	of	the	survey	population	used	government-managed	pastures	in	the	past,	however	only	33%	plan	to	lease.	While	respondents	did	not	state	why	they	planned	or	did	not	plan	to	lease,	a	potential	reason	for	the	decrease	could	be	an	increase	in	private	costs	relative	to	when	the	pastures	were	government-managed.	Ranchers	who	used	government	pastures	but	do	no	plan	to	lease	will	likely	need	to	find	some	other	means	for	feeding	and	grazing	their	cattle	or	undergo	some	form	of	change	in	their	cattle	operation	or	management	practices.		 Table	5.2	reports	the	additional	labor	hours	per	week	respondents	would	be	willing	to	work	to	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices,	and	the	maximum	contract	length	
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respondents	would	be	willing	to	agree	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	or	to	adopt	certain	management	practices.			
Table	5.2:	Survey	statistics.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	
Variable	
Number	of	
Observations	 Survey	Sample	
Cattle	Income	(%	of	total	income)	 N=30	
	0-19%	
	
13.3%
20-39%	
	
23.3%	
40-59%	
	
13.3%	
60-79%	
	
13.3%	
80-100%	
	
36.7%	
	 	 	
Off-farm	Income	(%	of	total	income)	 N=30	
	0-19%	
	
76.7%
20-39%	
	
10.0%	
40-59%	
	
6.7%	
60-79%	
	
6.7%	
80-100%	
	
0.0%	
	 	 	
Former	Government	Pasture	User	(%)	 N=30	 43%	
	 	 	Plan	to	Lease	Former	Government	Pastures	
(%)	 N=30	 33%	
	 	 	Government	Program	User	(%)	 N=30 60%
	 	 	Respondents	in	Brown/Dark	Brown	Soil	
Zone	 N=30	 56.7%	
	 	 	Experience	(years)	 N=30 31.8	(14.34)
	 	 	Additional	Labor	(hours/week)	 N=27 5.2	(3.14)
	 	 	Maximum	Contract	Length	(Years)	 N=29 7.7	(4.47)
	 	 	Lower	Bound	Cost	Share	(%)a	 N=29	 38.3	(16.49)
Upper	Bound	Cost	Share	(%)b		 N=28	 61.8	(18.06)	
a	calclulated	as	the	mean	of	the	lowest	cost	share	respondents	said	they'd	probably	participate	in.	
b	calclulated	as	the	mean	of	the	lowest	cost	share	respondents	said	they'd	definitely	participate	in.		Survey	respondents	were	willing	to	work	an	additional	5.2	hours	per	week	on	average	to	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices	to	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services.	This	could	indicate	that	ranchers	perceive	rotational	grazing	practices	to	also	have	private	benefits,	or	they	value	the	increase	in	public	benefits	provided	by	increased	ecosystem	services.	If	there	
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were	no	perceived	benefits,	ranchers	would	likely	require	economic	incentives	to	adopt	such	practices.			 The	average	maximum	agreeable	contract	length	was	7.7	years.	Only	33%	of	respondents	indicated	that	they	planed	to	lease	government	pastures,	which	might	shed	light	on	why	ranchers	are	resistant	to	leases	equal	to	or	greater	than	15	years	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017b).			 Cost-share	programs	are	offered	in	Saskatchewan	where	the	government	covers	a	portion	of	the	approved	costs	that	farmers	must	undertake	to	implement	management	practices	to	improve	or	maintain	environmental	quality	and	ecosystem	services	on	agricultural	land	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017a).	If	offered	a	cost-share	program	to	adopt	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services	rather	than	a	uniform	payment	scheme,	the	average	survey	respondent	would	require	between	38.3%	and	61.8%	of	the	costs	to	be	covered	(Table	5.2).	For	context,	the	Saskatchewan	government	offered	an	environmental	solutions	cost-share	program	that	covered	20-50%	of	eligible	costs	up	to	$50,000	for	projects	that	would	provide	environmental	or	public	benefits,	and	another	native	rangeland	grazing	management	cost-share	program	that	would	cover	50%	of	eligible	costs	up	to	$10,000	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017a).	This	suggests	that	the	cost-share	programs	offered	in	Saskatchewan	likely	provide	enough	compensation	for	ranchers	to	consider	participating	in	a	given	program.	In	any	case,	the	acceptable	cost-share	ranges	could	be	useful	to	policymakers	for	comparing	the	potential	costs	relative	to	uniform	payment	schemes	to	possibly	identify	the	most	cost-effective	means	of	maximizing	both	participation	and	the	environmental	benefits	of	a	conservation	program.			
5.2.2	Statistical	Differences	Between	Respondents	Relative	to	Soil	Zone		 The	majority	of	native	grasslands	in	Saskatchewan	are	located	in	the	southwest	region	of	the	province.	Southwest	Saskatchewan	is	also	predominantly	classified	as	having	brown	or	dark	brown	soil	zones,	whereas	other	regions	of	the	province	are	mostly	black	or	grey	soil	zone	classes.	Since	the	majority	of	native	grasslands	are	located	in	brown	or	dark	brown	soil	zones,	I	compare	summary	statistics	between	survey	respondents	in	the	brown	or	dark	brown	soil	zones	to	those	outside	these	soil	zones.	Therefore	any	statistical	
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differences	between	soil	zones	are	not	necessarily	driven	by	the	soil	zone	classes,	but	rather	other	factors	such	as	land	conditions,	agricultural	land	use	options,	and	the	presence	of	more	native	grasslands	in	the	brown	soil	zone.	Native	grasslands	might	offer	a	broader,	or	at	least	different	range	of	ecosystem	services	than	tame	or	seeded	pastures	found	in	other	soil	zones,	and	therefore	could	be	a	higher	priority	for	conservation	purposes	to	provide	public	ecosystem	services.		The	average	survey	participant’s	ranch	in	the	brown	or	dark	brown	soil	zones	is	considerably	larger	and	has	more	cattle	compared	to	ranches	outside	these	soil	zones	within	the	sample	population	(Table	5.3).	The	native	grasslands	in	the	brown	soil	zone	are	likely	not	as	suitable	for	crop	production	as	the	more	arable	land	in	the	black	and	grey	soil	zones.	Therefore	the	most	productive	use	of	native	grasslands	is	often	livestock	production,	leading	to	larger	cattle	operations	in	these	regions,	while	the	opportunity	cost	of	having	significantly	large	cattle	operations	in	other	soil	zones	might	be	greater	because	of	potentially	more	profitable	alternative	land	use	options	such	as	crop	production.		 Government	of	Saskatchewan	(2018b)	pasture	maps	show	that	there	were	a	greater	number	of	provincial	pastures	in	non-brown	soil	zones,	although	the	total	pasture	area	and	livestock	capacity	would	differ	between	soil	zones	and	individual	pastures.	However,	a	greater	proportion	of	survey	respondents	in	the	brown	soil	zones	used	public,	government	owned	pastures	in	the	past	and	indicated	a	plan	to	lease	these	pastures	in	the	future	than	respondents	in	other	soil	zones	(Table	5.3).		While	the	percentage	of	respondents	in	non-brown	soil	zones	who	used	and	plan	to	lease	government	pastures	is	constant	at	30.8%,	the	percentage	of	respondents	in	brown	soil	zones	who	plan	to	lease	former	public	pastures	is	35.3%,	17.7%	lower	than	the	52.9%	of	survey	respondents	in	brown	soil	zones	who	used	public	pastures	(Table	5.3).	This	further	highlights	the	population	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	who	will	no	longer	have	access	to	the	grazing	and	livestock	management	services	the	government	pastures	formerly	provided.	The	producers	in	the	brown	soil	zones	who	used	a	public	pasture	but	do	not	plan	to	lease	will	likely	have	to	find	other	options	for	feed	or	undergo	changes	within	their	cattle	operations	as	previously	mentioned.	However	it	is	important	to	note	the	small	sample	size	when	interpreting	these	results,	as	the	sample	might	not	accurately	reflect	how	many	Saskatchewan	ranchers	used	these	pastures	or	plan	to	lease	them	in	the	future.		
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Table	5.3:	Comparative	statistics	between	survey	respondents	relative	to	soil	
zone.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.		
	Variable	
Brown/Dark	Brown	Soil	
Zone	(N=17)	
Black	Soil	and	Other	Soil	
Zones	(N=13	unless	
otherwise	stated)	
	 	 	Number	of	Cattle	 498.5	(457.3)	 (N=12)	211.7	(84.5)	
	 	 	Farm	Size	(Acres)	
	 	Owned	Land	 3296.5	(2697)	 957.1	(501.6)	
	 	 	Rented	Land	 2600	(2602.2) 460.9	(686.7)
	 	 	Former	
Government	
Pasture	Users	(%)	 52.9%	 30.8%	
	 	 	Plan	To	Lease	
Former	
Government	
Pastures	(%)	 35.3%	 30.8%	
	 	 	Participated	in	
BMP	Programs	(%)	 64.7%	 53.9%			 A	greater	proportion	of	respondents	in	the	brown	soil	zones	participated	in	BMP	programs,	with	64.7%	of	respondents	participating	compared	to	53.9%	in	other	soil	zones	(Table	5.3).	While	the	rate	of	BMP	participation	across	soil	zones	is	similar,	the	disparity	can	possibly	be	explained	by,	or	related	to,	average	farm	size	and	cattle	income	levels	across	soil	zones.	In	the	sample	population,	the	larger	ranches	and	more	cattle	in	the	brown	soil	zones	appeared	to	be	more	dependent	on	their	cattle	operation	for	their	income.	As	Figure	5.1	shows,	47%	of	respondents	in	brown	soil	zones	derived	80%	or	more	of	their	total	income	from	cattle	compared	to	23%	of	respondents	in	other	soil	zones.	This	suggest	that	a	greater	proportion	of	ranchers	surveyed	in	brown	soil	zones	are	dependent	on	ranching	as	their	main	source	of	income	compared	to	ranchers	surveyed	in	other	soil	zones	who	could	earn	a	greater	proportion	of	their	income	from	other	farming	activities	such	as	crop	production.	Therefore	survey	participants	outside	brown	soil	zones	who	are	less	dependent	on	cattle	as	their	main	source	of	income	might	be	less	inclined	to	participate	in	
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BMP	programs	that	assist	their	ranching	practices	and	will	instead	focus	on	other	farming	activities.	For	ranchers	in	the	brown	soil	zones,	whose	income	is	primarily	cattle	based,	the	benefits	of	participating	in	cattle	based	BMP	programs	might	be	greater	and	therefore	a	greater	proportion	of	ranchers	in	these	soil	zones	might	participate	in	BMPs.		
	
Figure	5.1:	Comparing	cattle	income	as	percentage	of	total	income	between	survey	participants	
in	different	soil	zones.			
5.2.3	Policy	Structure	and	Ecosystem	Services	Preferences				 A	primary	objective	of	the	survey	was	to	examine	Saskatchewan	ranchers’	opinions	regarding	policy	preferences.	Survey	respondents	were	presented	with	three	policy	options	and	asked	to	rank	them	from	most	to	least	preferable.	Cost-share	programs	were	the	most	preferred	policy	option	(79%),	followed	by	extension	programs	and	then	conservation	easements	(Figure	5.2).	The	stated	preference	for	cost-share	programs	suggests	that	monetary	compensation	for	participation	is	important	to	ranchers.	Extension	programs,	which	leave	management	flexibility	and	decision-making	to	the	rancher	but	offer	no	compensation,	were	preferable	to	conservation	easements.	Conservation	easements,	primarily	characterized	by	permanent	contract	lengths,	were	the	least	preferred	policy	option,	suggesting	that	shorter	contracts	or	land	management	agreements	are	preferable	to	ranchers.		
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Figure	5.2:	Most	preferred	policy	structure	among	survey	respondents	(N=29).		Short-term	contracts	might	be	preferable	to	ranchers	to	maintain	management	flexibility	into	the	future,	as	new	management	practices	or	potential	opportunities	could	become	available	that	might	provide	greater	benefits.	The	policy	preferences	generally	indicate	that	ranchers	require	some	level	of	compensation,	prefer	to	have	management	flexibility,	and	find	short-term	agreements	preferable	to	long-term	conservation	arrangements.	These	results	are	consistent	with	findings	from	Sorice	et	al.	(2013)	and	Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009)	that	examined	how	program	structure	affects	farmer	preferences	and	participation	in	conservation	programs.		The	survey	also	aimed	to	assess	ranchers’	opinions	and	attitudes	regarding	the	provision	and	benefits	of	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands.	Claasen	et	al.	(2008)	suggested	that	conservation	programs	require	well-defined	environmental	goals,	and	aligning	these	goals	with	ecosystem	services	that	ranchers	value	and	find	beneficial	might	increase	participation	in	these	programs.	Survey	respondents	were	presented	with	three	ecosystem	services,	carbon	sequestration,	wildlife	habitat,	and	water	quality,	and	asked	to	rank	the	services	from	most	to	least	beneficial	to	society.	In	this	manner	respondents	would	rank	the	ecosystem	services	according	to	which	they	believe	provided	the	most	public	benefits.		Water	quality	was	ranked	the	most	socially	beneficial	ecosystem	service	by	57%	of	respondents,	followed	by	wildlife	and	habitat	conservation	and	carbon	sequestration	(Figure	5.3).	The	low	importance	ascribed	to	carbon	sequestration,	based	on	comments	
79%	
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4%	
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provided	by	the	respondents,	could	possibly	be	explained	by	a	lack	of	understanding	or	information	on	the	benefits	that	increased	soil	carbon	provides.	While	carbon	sequestration	provides	several	private	and	public	benefits	such	as	climate	change	mitigation,	increased	forage	production,	improved	air	quality,	increased	soil	productivity,	quality,	and	formation,	and	reduced	soil	erosion	(Follett	and	Reed,	2010;	Srivastava	et	al.,	2012),	ranchers	might	not	know	about	these	benefits,	the	benefits	might	not	be	as	visible	or	clear	to	ranchers,	or	they	may	not	value	these	benefits	as	highly	as	others.	Higher	water	quality	and	enhanced	wildlife	habitats	are	visible,	whereas	carbon	sequestration	is	not.	Therefore	the	benefits	of	carbon	sequestration	might	not	be	as	noticeable	or	clear	to	ranchers	as	the	private	and	public	benefits	gained	from	water	quality	and	wildlife	habitat.	This	could	explain	why	ranchers	in	the	sample	population	viewed	water	quality	and	wildlife	habitat	as	more	beneficial	ecosystem	services	than	carbon	sequestration.	
	
Figure	5.3:	Most	beneficial	ecosystem	service	to	society	according	to	survey	respondents	(N=30).	
	
5.2.4	Rancher	Attitudes	Towards	Conservation	Policies	and	Ecosystem	Services			 To	assess	survey	participants’	attitudes	and	opinions	towards	conservation	policies	and	programs,	respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	whether	they	agreed,	disagreed,	strongly	agreed,	or	strongly	disagreed	with	a	series	of	statements.	Responses	to	these	statements	can	provide	insight	on	how	respondents	view	features	of	conservation	policy	such	as	transaction	costs,	opportunity	costs,	and	payments	for	ecosystem	services.	The	mean	responses,	on	a	scale	from	one	(strongly	disagree)	to	four	(strongly	agree),	to	policy	
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based	opinion	questions	are	shown	in	Table	5.4.	The	average	survey	respondent	indicated	that	they	would	voluntarily	adopt	management	practices	that	could	increase	ecosystem	services	if	they	had	more	information	on	the	different	types	of	management	practices	(mean	=	3.03).	This	suggests	that	extension	programs,	the	second	most	preferred	policy	structure	behind	cost-share	programs	as	discussed	earlier,	could	be	effective	at	increasing	ecosystem	services	by	providing	ranchers	with	information	regarding	alternative	management	practices.	However,	the	average	response	towards	the	alternative	of	providing	monetary	compensation	(mean=3.27)	also	demonstrates	a	somewhat	strong	opinion	that	the	government	should	provide	monetary	compensation	for	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	private	land.	As	Gao	et	al.	(2016),	Kemp	et	al.	(2013),	and	Klimek	et	al.	(2013)	have	suggested,	this	supports	the	position	that	economic	incentives	might	be	necessary	to	encourage	ranchers	to	adopt	alternative	management	practices	and	participate	in	conservation	programs.	
Table	5.4:	Opinion	responses	to	survey	questions	related	to	policy	where	
1=strongly	disagree,	4=strongly	agree.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	N=30	
unless	otherwise	stated.	
Question	 		 Sample	Mean	
If	I	had	more	information	on	grassland	and	grazing	
management	practices	that	could	potentially	
increase	ecosystem	services,	I	would	adopt	these	
management	practices	voluntarily.	
	
3.03	(0.72)	
	 	 	The	government	should	provide	monetary	
compensation	to	grassland/pasture	landowners	
and	lessees	for	producing	and	conserving	
ecosystem	services	on	their	land.	
	
3.27	(0.57)	
	 	 			 Another	two	questions	in	the	opinion	response	section	of	the	survey	dealt	with	attitudes	towards	program	transaction	costs.	Transaction	costs	have	been	shown	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	total	policy	costs	in	conservation	programs.	For	example	Coggan,	Whitten,	and	Bennett	(2010)	found	that	public	and	private	transaction	costs	accounted	for	anywhere	between	21%	and	50%	of	total	costs	after	reviewing	several	conservation	programs.	Survey	participants	were	asked	questions	regarding	transaction	costs	to	help	
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reveal	how	transaction	costs	affect	participation	in	conservation	programs.	The	majority	(56%)	of	survey	participants	agreed	that	it	is	easy	to	find	and	learn	about	existing	conservation	programs,	suggesting	that	search	costs	are	low	and	do	not	present	a	major	barrier	(Figure	5.4).	However,	the	responses	represented	only	a	slight	majority,	indicating	that	an	increase	in	outreach	regarding	the	availability	of	conservation	programs	might	aid	in	reaching	a	wider	range	of	potential	participants.		A	similar	distribution	was	also	revealed	for	negotiation	costs,	as	55%	of	respondents	said	they	would	be	willing	to	take	on	additional	administrative	duties	and	paperwork	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program,	whereas	41%	responded	that	they	were	not	willing	to	take	on	these	duties	(Figure	5.4).	Respondents	who	are	not	willing	to	take	on	additional	paperwork,	administrative	work,	or	other	negotiation	costs	are	less	likely	to	participate	in	conservation	programs.	Therefore	conservation	programs	that	minimize	private	transaction	costs	can	expect	higher	degrees	of	participation	and	therefore	greater	environmental	impact.			
	Figure	5.4:	Survey	responses	to	transaction	cost	questions.			 Survey	respondents	were	also	asked	opinion-based	questions	regarding	ecosystem	services	to	assess	whether	they	believe	landowners,	including	themselves,	have	a	responsibility	to	conserve	or	enhance	ecosystem	services	on	their	land,	if	respondents	would	be	willing	to	reduce	their	cattle	grazing	stocking	rate	to	increase	ecosystem	services,	
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and	whether	they	believe	their	current	management	practices	effectively	provide	ecosystem	services.	These	questions	are	presented	in	Table	5.5	and	Figure	5.5.	Survey	respondents	indicated	that	they	strongly	believe	landowners	have	a	responsibility	to	manage	their	land	in	a	sustainable	manner	that	conserves	or	enhances	ecosystem	services	(mean=3.43,	Table	5.5).	However,	when	asked	if	they	would	reduce	their	cattle-stocking	rate	(animal	units	per	acre)	the	mean	was	2.37,	representing	a	fairly	neutral	response	and	possibly	indicating	that	the	opportunity	cost	of	doing	so	might	be	a	deterrent.	Responses	to	these	questions	suggest	that	ranchers	in	the	sample	population	believe	grasslands	should	be	managed	in	a	sustainable	manner	that	provides	ecosystem	services,	but	if	such	management	practices	decrease	their	private	benefits	and	revenue	they	would	be	less	willing	to	adopt	such	practices.	Therefore	if	the	socially	optimal	production	of	ecosystem	services	comes	at	too	great	an	opportunity	cost	to	landowners,	ranchers	will	require	compensation.		
Table	5.5:	Opinion	responses	to	survey	questions	related	to	ecosystem	services	
where	1=strongly	disagree,	4=strongly	agree.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	
N=30.	
Question	 		 Sample	Mean	
Pasture	and	grassland	landowners	and	lessees	
have	a	responsibility	to	use	management	practices	
that	conserve	or	enhance	ecosystem	services	on	
their	land.	
	
3.43	(0.50)	
	 	 	I	would	be	willing	to	reduce	my	cattle	grazing	
stocking	rate,	meaning	decrease	the	number	of	
animal	units	per	acre	on	my	land,	if	it	would	
increase	ecosystem	services	on	my	land.	 		 2.37	(0.72)	
	 	 	
	 	 		 While	the	ranchers	in	the	sample	population	indicated	that	they	are	open	to	increasing	the	production	of	ecosystem	services	on	their	land,	they	seem	to	believe	they	already	effectively	provide	ecosystem	services.	For	example,	90%,	97%,	and	90%	of	survey	respondents	agreed	or	strongly	agreed	that	their	current	management	practices	effectively	provide	carbon	sequestration,	wildlife	and	wildlife	habitat,	and	water	quality	respectively	(Figure	5.5).	It	is	quite	possible	that	several	ranchers	in	Saskatchewan	do	provide	an	adequate	amount	of	ecosystem	services	on	their	grasslands.	However	from	a	policy	
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standpoint,	if	ranchers	believe	they	already	effectively	produce	an	acceptable	amount	of	ecosystem	services	they	might	not	think	an	increase	in	ecosystem	services	is	necessary,	and	therefore	could	be	less	likely	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	Therefore	if	there	is	a	societal	motive	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	private	grasslands	beyond	the	current	levels,	economic	incentives	could	be	required	to	persuade	and	encourage	ranchers	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provisions	and	offset	the	opportunity	costs	of	doing	so.		
	
Figure	5.5:	Survey	responses	to	whether	respondents’	current	management	practices	effectively	
provided	or	conserved	ecosystem	services.		
5.3	Survey	Comments			 The	survey	instrument	included	an	opportunity	for	participants	to	express	their	general	attitudes	through	open-ended	questions	about	conservation	policies,	grassland	management,	and	ecosystem	services.	Such	comments	provide	valuable	information	regarding	the	opinions	of	livestock	producers	who	provide	ecosystem	services	and	therefore	could	be	affected	by	policy.	Some	prevalent	opinions,	responses,	and	comments	are	outlined	here,	while	a	complete	record	of	all	survey	comments	are	provided	in	Appendix	B.		 When	asked	about	potential	policy	structure	preferences,	20	of	the	30	survey	respondents	provided	a	response.	Seven	respondents	expressed	preferences	for	varying	types	of	incentive	based	programs	such	as	cost-shares,	a	potential	tax	relief	for	meeting	a	
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given	conservational	criteria,	“results-based”	programs	that	only	pay	producers	if	they	meet	specific,	measurable	habitat	or	grassland	quality	parameters	rather	than	just	for	implementing	practices,	or	yearly	payments	on	a	per	acre	basis	for	providing	wildlife	habitat	conservation	such	as	wetlands	or	forested	areas	to	encourage	landowners	to	maintain	these	areas.	Three	respondents	were	in	favor	of	creating	a	carbon-trading	program	whereby	carbon	credits	or	habitat	credits	could	be	bought	and	sold	to	incentivize	grassland	conservation.	This	suggests	that	there	are	ranchers	who	prefer	a	market-based	approach	to	promoting	ecosystem	services.	Two	respondents	also	expressed	that	they	were	against	policy	or	government	involvement	altogether.			 The	vast	majority	of	survey	participants	(93%)	indicated	that	they	would	consider	changing	management	practices	if	it	would	increase	ecosystem	services.	When	asked	a	follow	up	question	as	to	why	they	would	consider	changing	management	practices	to	increase	ecosystem	services,	the	reasons	for	doing	so	were	quite	similar.	Respondents	commonly	cited	sustainability,	conservation,	the	environment,	the	good	of	future	generations	and	everyone	today,	and	just	doing	the	right	thing	in	general	as	reasons	for	possibly	changing	management	practices	to	promote	ecosystem	services.	Some	also	cited	the	relationship	between	positive	environmental	outcomes	and	personal	benefits	as	healthy	grasslands	translate	to	increased	productivity	and	profits	for	the	rancher,	so	increasing	ecosystem	services	is	beneficial	for	both	them	personally	and	society	as	a	whole.	However	it	was	noted	that	adopting	management	practices	to	increase	ecosystem	services	would	also	depend	on	how	the	change	would	affect	them	financially,	This	could	suggest	that	ranchers	are	willing	to	make	management	changes	that	could	increase	ecosystem	services	but	both	explicit	private	costs	and	implicit	opportunity	costs	must	be	accounted	for	when	considering	these	potential	changes.	
	 It	is	important	to	note	that	there	were	a	number	of	respondents	(20%)	who	commented	on	the	management	practices	presented	in	the	survey.	While	respondents	were	asked	what	management	practices	they	would	be	willing	to	implement	to	increase	ecosystem	services,	some	questions	framed	an	increase	in	ecosystem	services	as	a	result	of	reducing	grazing	intensity.	Several	respondents	indicated	that	a	simple	overall	reduction	in	grazing	intensity	is	not	a	guaranteed	method	or	the	best	way	to	increase	ecosystem	services.	For	example,	a	management	practice	that	was	suggested	multiple	times	was	a	high	
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intensity,	short	time	interval	rotational	grazing	system.	The	practice	involves	grazing	livestock	intensively	on	a	plot	of	land	for	a	relatively	short	duration,	and	then	moving	the	livestock	to	another	plot	and	letting	the	previous	plot	rest.	Appropriate	grazing	practices	are	undoubtedly	important	for	maintaining	healthy,	sustainable	grasslands	and	supporting	ecosystem	services.	However,	the	appropriate	grazing	practices	and	intensity	can	likely	differ	depending	on	the	ecosystem	service	in	question	and	the	condition	and	location	of	any	given	grassland.	Considering	grassland	bird	habitat	as	an	example,	Askins	et	al.	(2007)	suggest	that	the	varying	climate	and	geographic	conditions	across	the	Canadian	prairies	and	the	individual	needs	and	responses	to	grazing	practices	among	grassland	bird	species	makes	it	impossible	to	recommend	any	one	optimal	grazing	practice	to	conserve	habitat	for	grassland	bird	species	across	all	prairie	grasslands.	An	important	takeaway	is	that	there	is	no	single	management	practice	that	is	best	at	increasing	all	types	of	ecosystem	services	across	all	grasslands.	The	heterogeneity	of	grasslands,	both	native	and	seeded,	can	lead	to	alternative	practices	having	greater	or	lesser	effects	in	different	regions	based	on	the	grassland	conditions	in	a	given	area.	While	alternative	methods	might	be	more	effective	at	increasing	certain	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	than	decreasing	grazing	intensity,	suggesting	it	in	the	survey	served	the	purpose	of	evaluating	the	opportunity	costs	ranchers	face	for	participating	in	a	potential	conservation	program.	
5.4	Willingness-to-Accept	Results			 WTA	intervals	were	estimated	non-parametrically	and	econometrically	to	determine	a	price	point	that	could	serve	as	an	economic	incentive	to	encourage	participation	in	a	conservation	program.	The	purpose	of	the	non-parametric	WTA	estimates	and	WTA	regression	is	to	estimate	a	cost-effective	economic	incentive	that	would	encourage	ranchers	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	The	WTA	interval	is	interpreted	as	the	range	in	compensation	needed	for	ranchers	to	incur	a	10%	reduction	in	grazing	intensity,	which	is	assumed	to	be	the	opportunity	cost	of	a	change	in	management	practices	to	increase	ecosystem	services.	A	10%	reduction	in	grazing	intensity	was	used	so	respondents	would	consider	the	lost	production	or	opportunity	costs	they	might	incur	from	a	change	in	management	practices	if	they	were	to	participate	in	an	actual	conservation	program.	For	
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context,	Ruijs	et	al.	(2017)	found	that	the	opportunity	cost	of	increasing	biodiversity	by	5%	can	be	a	13%	decrease	in	agricultural	revenues,	while	increasing	carbon	sequestration	by	10%	resulted	in	a	4%	decrease	in	agricultural	revenues.	Using	the	results	of	this	survey,	a	10%	decrease	in	grazing	intensity	suggests	that	the	opportunity	cost	of	participating	in	the	hypothetical	program	for	the	average	survey	respondent	would	be	38	fewer	cattle	that	they	could	graze,	based	on	the	sample	population	mean	for	cattle	numbers.	The	WTA	estimation	results	could	also	be	extrapolated	to	reflect	WTA	intervals	at	other	levels	of	opportunity	costs	relative	to	current	production	levels	among	the	survey	population.		 Non-parametric	WTA	estimates	were	calculated	as	the	mean	values	of	the	lowest	amount	survey	respondents	indicated	they	would	“probably”	and	“definitely”	accept	on	the	payment	card.	The	lower	bound	WTA	was	estimated	to	be	$33.25	per	acre	and	the	upper	bound	WTA	estimate	was	$53.60	per	acre	(Table	5.6).	These	results	suggest	that	a	payment	within	this	interval	would	be	required	for	the	average	survey	respondent	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	that	has	an	opportunity	cost	of	10%	of	their	current	production	level	to	increase	ecosystem	services.		
Table	5.6:	Non-parametric	estimates	for	WTA.	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	
Variable	
Number	of	
Observations	 Survey	Sample	
	Lower	Bound	WTA	($/acre)a	 N=28	 $33.25	(17.74)	
	Upper	Bound	WTA	($/acre)b	 N=25	 $53.60	(26.75)	 		
a	calclulated	as	the	mean	of	the	lowest	amount	respondents	said	they'd	probably	accept.	
b	calclulated	as	the	mean	of	the	lowest	amount	respondents	said	they'd	definitely	accept.			 A	double-bounded	interval	estimation	approach	was	also	used	to	estimate	the	mean	and	median	WTA	of	survey	participants	econometrically.	Variables	used	in	the	WTA	regression	were	chosen	to	control	for	farm	and	farmer	characteristics	that	past	research	suggests	might	influence	rancher	participation	in	voluntary	conservation	programs	(Table	5.7).	Farm	and	farmer	characteristics	that	are	believed	to	positively	influence	participation	in	conservation	programs	are	expected	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	WTA.	Therefore	variables	that	are	expected	to	positively	influence	participation	in	conservation	programs	are	expected	to	have	negative	coefficients.	Conversely,	variables	that	might	negatively	
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influence	participation	in	conservation	programs	will	increase	WTA,	representing	a	decrease	in	likelihood	or	aversion	to	participating	in	a	conservation	program,	and	are	therefore	expected	to	have	positive	coefficients.	Overall	ranchers	who	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	conservation	programs	will	have	lower	WTAs	than	ranchers	who	are	less	likely	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	Lower	WTAs	could	signal	that	a	rancher’s	opportunity	cost	of	increasing	ecosystem	services	is	lower	relative	to	other	ranchers	and	therefore	they	are	willing	to	accept	less,	or	it	could	represent	ideological	beliefs	that	the	rancher	wants	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provisions	on	their	land	and	are	willing	to	accept	less	compensation	to	do	so.	Higher	WTAs	could	reflect	higher	opportunity	costs	of	ecosystem	service	provision	relative	to	other	ranchers,	or	possibly	an	aversion	to	policy	programs	or	government	involvement	and	therefore	they	might	only	participate	for	a	payment	greater	than	their	actual	opportunity	costs.	
Table	5.7:	Description	of	independent	variables	used	in	econometric	analysis.	
Variable		 		 Description	
Cattle	
	
Continuous	variable	representing	the	number	of	
cattle	each	survey	participant	reported.	
Acres	
	
Continuous	variable	representing	the	total	
number	of	acres,	owned	and	rented,	used	for	
cattle	production.	
Cattle	Income	
	
Ordinal	variable	indicating	percentage	of	total	
income	derived	from	cattle	operation.	1=0-19%,	
2=20-39%,	3=40-59%,	4=60-79%,	4=80-100%.	
Age	
	
Ordinal	variable	indicating	age	range.	1=29	or	less,	
2=30-39,	3=40-49,	4=50-59,	5=60	and	over.	
Education	
	
Binary	variable	indicating	whether	or	not	survey	
participants	had	a	post-secondary	degree.	1=yes.		
Male		
	
Binary	variable.	1=male.		
Paperwork	
	
Binary	variable	indicating	whether	or	not	survey	
participants	agreed	or	disagreed	to	take	on	
additional	paperwork	and	administrative	duties	to	
participate	in	a	conservation	program.	1=yes.	
Agreed	to	Voluntarily	
Reduce	Grazing	Intensity	
		
Binary	variable	indicating	whether	or	not	survey	
participants	agreed	to	voluntarily	reduce	their	
cattle	stocking	rate	or	grazing	intensity	to	increase	
ecosystem	services.	1=yes.		
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	 Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009)	state	that	farm	size,	education,	and	farmer	interest	are	all	generally	considered	to	positively	influence	participation	in	conservation	programs,	while	age	negatively	influences	the	likelihood	of	an	individual	participating.	Therefore	the	a	priori	expectations	are	for	the	cattle,	acres,	and	education	variables	to	have	negative	coefficients	and	for	age	to	have	a	positive	coefficient.	Cattle	income	could	also	signal	farm	size	as	larger	cattle	operations	likely	generate	more	of	their	total	income	from	cattle,	which	would	suggest	a	negative	coefficient	expectation	for	the	cattle	income	variable.	However	the	more	income	one	derives	from	their	cattle	operation	the	greater	the	opportunity	cost	of	displacing	cattle,	which	would	suggest	a	positive	coefficient	could	be	expected	as	well.	Therefore	the	ex	ante	expectation	for	the	sign	of	the	cattle	income	variable	is	indeterminate.	The	variables	for	paperwork	and	whether	or	not	survey	participants	agreed	to	voluntarily	reduce	grazing	intensity	reflect	survey	participants’	interest	in	conserving	ecosystem	services	and	conservation	programs.	The	more	interest	a	rancher	has	in	grassland	conservation	and	conservation	programs,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	participate	in	a	program	(Ruto	and	Garrod,	2009).	For	example,	respondents	who	agreed	that	they	would	take	on	paperwork	and	administrative	duties	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	are	likely	more	interested	in	conservation	programs.	Likewise,	agreeing	to	voluntarily	reduce	grazing	intensity	to	increase	ecosystem	services	indicates	a	greater	level	of	interest	in	conservation	and	increasing	ecosystem	services.	Therefore	I	expect	both	of	these	variables	to	have	negative	coefficients.	There	is	no	ex	ante	expectation	for	the	sign	of	the	gender	coefficient	as	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	a	significant	difference	in	WTA	or	perceived	opportunity	costs	among	male	and	female	ranchers.		 For	the	WTA	values	the	upper	bound	estimation	has	fewer	observations	due	to	some	survey	participants	not	responding	“definitely”	to	any	values,	which	results	in	right-censored	data	in	the	lower	bound	estimation	but	missing	observations	in	the	upper	bound	estimation.	As	expected	the	mean	and	median	WTA	estimates	are	lesser	in	the	lower	bound	regression	due	to	expanding	the	WTA	interval	and	coding	both	“probably”	and	“definitely”	responses	as	“yes”	responses	(Table	5.8).	The	mean	WTA	estimates	from	the	econometric	estimation	can	also	be	compared	to	the	non-parametric	mean	WTA	estimates	in	Table	5.2.	The	lower	and	upper	bound	non-parametric	estimates	of	mean	WTA	were	$33.25	and	$53.60,	compared	to	$34.83	and	$42.58	from	the	econometric	estimation.	
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Table	5.8:	Lower	and	upper	bound	coefficient	estimates	of	WTA	function	following	
Broberg	and	Brännlund	(2008)	expansion	approach.	Standard	deviations	in	
parentheses.	
Variable	 		 Lower	Bound	 		 Upper	Bound	
Constant	
	
2.08	(0.765)***	
	
2.25	(0.698)***	
Cattle		
	
0.003	(0.001)***	
	
0.002	(0.001)**	
Acres	
	
-0.0002	(0.000085)**	
	
-0.0001	(0.000081)	
Cattle	Income	
	
-0.19	(0.095)**	
	
-0.228	(0.092)**	
Age	
	
0.597	(0.169)***	
	
0.604	(0.155)***	
Education	
	
0.585	(0.353)*	
	
0.325	(0.327)	
Male	
	
-0.726	(0.3399)**	
	
-0.274	(0.340)	
Paperwork	
	
-0.338	(0.2714)	
	
-0.527	(0.252)**	
Agreed	to	Voluntarily	
Reduce	Grazing	Intensity	
	
-0.271	(0.263)	 -0.237	(0.245)	
	 	 	 	 	Mean	WTA	(per	acre)	
	
34.83	
	
42.58	
Median	WTA	(per	acre)	
	
32.53	
	
40.08	
	 	 	 	 	Number	of	Observations	 	 27	 	 24	
*	Significant	at	10%	level.	
	 	 	 	**	Significant	at	5%	level.	
	 	 	 	***	Significant	at	1%	level.	
	
	
	 	 	 	The	upper	bound	econometric	estimate	is	considerably	more	conservative	than	the	non-parametric	estimate.	This	can	be	explained	by	the	interval	estimation	approach	setting	the	lower	limit	equal	to	the	payment	card	value	one	interval	less	than	the	amount	they	“definitely”	agreed	to.	In	contrast,	the	non-parametric	estimate	is	simply	the	mean	of	the	higher	limits	used	for	the	interval	estimation	approach.	The	lower	bound	estimates	from	each	method	are	much	closer,	with	the	greater	WTA	value	from	the	interval	estimation	approach	likely	due	to	the	higher	bound	being	greater	than	the	values	used	to	calculate	the	non-parametric	measure,	which	was	the	lowest	value	survey	participant’s	agreed	they	would	“probably”	participate.	In	general,	the	econometric	estimates	indicate	that	the	average	surveyed	rancher’s	WTA,	or	opportunity	cost,	for	decreasing	their	grazing	intensity	by	10%	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program	and	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services	lies	between	$34.83	and	$42.58	per	acre.	Scaling	these	results	suggests	that	ranchers	could	be	willing	to	accept	a	payment	between	$3.48	and	$4.26	per	acre	for	every	additional	1%	loss	in	opportunity	cost	relative	to	their	current	production	level.	The	
	59	
estimated	WTA	interval	could	also	be	useful	to	policymakers	for	comparing	the	potential	costs	under	a	payment	scheme	such	as	this	to	a	cost-share	program,	which	survey	respondents	indicated	needed	to	cover	between	38.3%	to	61.8%	of	costs	(Table	5.2),	to	identify	the	most	cost-effective	means	of	maximizing	both	participation	and	the	environmental	benefits	of	a	conservation	program.			 The	estimated	coefficients	are	interpreted	as	a	percentage	change	in	the	expected	WTA	to	decrease	grazing	intensity	given	a	one-unit	change	of	the	independent	variable.	Using	the	lower	bound	estimates	in	Table	5.7	as	an	example,	for	every	additional	acre	a	rancher	manages	their	estimated	WTA	decreases	by	0.02%,	while	for	every	additional	cow	a	rancher	has	their	WTA	increases	by	0.3%.	This	suggests	that	for	every	100	acres	the	average	rancher	manages,	their	WTA	is	predicted	to	decrease	$0.70	per	acre,	and	for	every	10	cattle	the	average	rancher	owns	their	WTA	is	predicted	to	increase	by	$1.04	per	acre.	For	an	ordinal	variable	such	as	cattle	income,	the	measured	effect	is	for	every	level	or	group	increase.	Therefore	if	a	rancher’s	income	from	cattle	production	rises	from	0-19%	to	20-39%	of	their	total	income,	on	average	their	WTA	is	predicted	to	decrease	by	19%.	However	the	magnitude	of	the	coefficients	should	be	interpreted	carefully	considering	the	small	sample	size	and	the	limited	observations	that	were	usable	for	econometric	analysis.	Some	variable	report	extreme	affects	or	quite	different	estimates	between	the	lower	and	upper	bound	estimates.	For	example	each	age	group	is	predicted	to	have	a	WTA	60%	higher	than	the	age	group	immediately	before	it,	while	males	are	estimated	to	have	a	WTA	72.6%	less	than	that	of	females	in	the	lower	bound	regression	and	27.4%	less	in	the	upper	bound	regression.	Therefore	some	of	the	measured	effects	appear	to	be	unreasonably	large	or	less	reliable.	A	larger,	more	representative	sample	of	ranchers	is	recommended	and	likely	necessary	to	accurately	estimate	the	magnitude	of	the	demographic	and	farm	factor	effects	on	one’s	WTA.	Although	the	limited	sample	size	detracts	from	the	estimation	and	analysis,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	coefficients	might	not	be	reliable,	this	analysis	still	allows	me	to	estimate	the	directional	effect	of	each	variable	and	calculate	the	mean	and	median	WTA	boundaries.		 The	coefficient	signs	are	as	expected	for	most	variables	while	the	cattle	income	and	gender	variables,	for	which	I	had	no	ex	ante	expectations,	both	had	a	negative	impact	on	WTA.	However	the	impact	of	the	cattle	and	education	variables	are	the	opposite	of	my	ex	
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ante	expectations.	Farm	size	was	expected	to	positively	affect	the	likelihood	of	participation	in	conservation	programs	according	to	Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009),	and	therefore	have	a	negative	coefficient.	However	the	cattle	coefficient	is	positive	and	statistically	significant	in	both	regressions.	This	could	be	due	to	the	framing	of	the	question,	as	the	more	cattle	a	rancher	has,	the	larger	the	opportunity	cost	of	decreasing	grazing	intensity.	Acres	has	a	negative	coefficient	since	the	payments	were	per	acre,	so	farms	with	more	land	area	might	be	willing	to	accept	less	per	acre	and	still	receive	a	large	return.	The	10%	reduction	in	grazing	could	be	roughly	interpreted	by	ranchers	as	a	10%	decrease	in	the	number	of	cattle	they	are	grazing	on	their	current	number	of	acres.	Therefore	the	acres	variable	might	capture	the	expected	effect	of	farm	size,	whereas	the	number	of	cattle	a	rancher	has	might	increase	their	opportunity	cost	of	reducing	their	grazing	intensity	and	therefore	increases	their	WTA	for	doing	so.			 Education	was	also	expected	to	positively	influence	participation	in	conservation	programs	according	to	Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009)	and	therefore	expected	to	negatively	impact	WTA.	However	the	measured	effect	of	education	on	WTA	in	the	WTA	regression	was	positive,	although	less	statistically	significant.	A	possible	explanation	is	that	ranchers	with	university	degrees	or	diplomas	could	have	an	increased	understanding	of	the	opportunity	costs	they	would	incur	from	decreasing	grazing	intensity,	and	therefore	have	a	higher	WTA	than	those	without	a	university	degree.	The	unexpected	sign,	or	at	least	the	magnitude	of	the	education	effect,	could	also	be	due	in	part	to	the	small	sample	size	and	limited	observations	used	in	the	estimation	process.		
5.5	Discussion		 Qualitative	and	quantitative	results	from	this	research	provide	useful	insight	regarding	rancher	preferences	for	conservation	policy	development	and	attitudes	towards	grassland	management	practices	and	ecosystem	services.	The	results	highlight	trends	and	common	opinions	among	ranchers	within	the	sample	that	might	reflect	the	broader	rancher	population.	However	with	only	30	completed	surveys,	it	is	important	to	keep	the	sample	size	in	mind	before	extrapolating	the	results	beyond	the	sample	population.		
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The	results	indicate	that	ranchers	within	the	survey	sample	generally	value	and	understand	the	public	and	private	benefits	associated	with	ecosystem	services.	The	majority	of	survey	participants	are	also	open	to	increasing	the	provision	and	conservation	of	ecosystem	services	on	their	land.	This	is	indicated	by	93%	of	the	survey	sample	agreeing	that	they	would	consider	changing	management	practices	if	it	would	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services,	and	the	average	respondent	also	agreed	that	if	they	were	given	information	on	management	practices	that	could	increase	ecosystem	services	on	their	land,	they	would	voluntarily	adopt	these	management	practices	(mean=3.0	where	1=strongly	disagree,	4=strongly	agree,	Table	5.4).	However	the	barrier	to	adopting	management	practices	that	can	potentially	provide	a	greater	degree	of	ecosystem	services	appears	to	be	the	private	costs	of	doing	so.	Increasing	ecosystem	services	provision	comes	at	an	opportunity	cost	to	ranchers,	either	in	the	form	of	increased	management	costs	or	implicit	opportunity	costs	related	to	lost	or	foregone	production.	For	example	the	theoretical	model	used	for	this	analysis	assumes	that	ranchers	choose	the	management	practices	that	maximizes	their	profit.	If	a	given	management	practice	that	produced	an	efficient	amount	of	ecosystems	services	was	also	the	profit	maximizing	option	for	a	rancher,	it	is	assumed	they	would	already	employ	the	management	practice	or	voluntarily	adopt	it	and	therefore	policy	would	not	be	needed.	The	results	indicate	that	many	ranchers	believe	their	current	management	practices	already	effectively	provide	ecosystem	services	(Figure	5.5),	and	this	could	be	true	on	several	Saskatchewan	grasslands.	However	if	this	is	not	the	case	or	there	is	a	social	desire	to	increase	ecosystem	service	provisions	beyond	the	current	level,	it	is	argued	that	financial	incentives	could	be	required	to	encourage	ranchers	and	landowners	to	adopt	management	practices	that	can	potentially	produce	a	greater	degree	of	ecosystem	services	(Gao	et	al.,	2016;	Kemp	et	al.,	2013;	Klimek	et	al.,	2013).	The	results	seem	to	support	this	notion	as	survey	participants	were	generally	not	willing	to	reduce	their	cattle	grazing	stocking	rate	to	increase	ecosystem	services	(mean=2.4,	Table	5.5),	with	the	reduction	in	stocking	rate	representing	the	opportunity	cost	of	providing	ecosystem	services.	One	survey	participant	also	commented	that	the	profit	margins	in	cattle	production	are	too	slim	to	make	significant	changes	in	management	practices	or	to	incur	additional	costs	to	increase	ecosystem	services.	Therefore	the	results	from	the	survey	
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support	the	position	that	economic	incentives	can,	and	might	be	required	to,	increase	provision	of	ecosystem	services	on	private	grasslands.		If	policy	initiatives	can	provide	economic	incentives	for	ranchers	to	adopt	certain	management	practices	and	provide	a	greater	degree	of	ecosystem	services,	the	incentive	offered	should	be	cost-effective	to	maximize	the	potential	environmental	benefits.	The	WTA	estimation	procedure	used	in	this	analysis	aims	to	identify	cost-effective	and	acceptable	compensation	levels	for	ranchers	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	Using	an	interval	estimation	approach	suggested	by	Broberg	and	Brännlund	(2008),	a	mean	WTA	interval	of	$34.83	to	$42.58	per	acre	was	estimated	as	the	minimum	amount	the	average	rancher	would	accept	to	offset	the	opportunity	cost	of	a	10%	decrease	in	grazing	intensity	from	participating	in	a	hypothetical	conservation	policy.	These	results	suggest	that	if	a	uniform	payment	scheme	were	implemented	to	increase	ecosystem	services	but	resulted	in	a	10%	loss	in	opportunity	costs	relative	to	current	production	levels	for	the	rancher,	a	participation	incentive	within	this	interval	would	be	required	for	the	average	survey	respondent	to	participate	in	the	conservation	program.	For	comparison,	according	to	the	Government	of	Saskatchewan	(2017c)	the	average	rental	rate	for	cultivated	land	in	Saskatchewan	is	$45.30	per	acre	while	the	median	rental	rate	is	$40.00	per	acre.	For	pastureland	rental	agreements,	the	average	rental	rate	for	livestock	grazing	agreements	on	pasturelands	in	Saskatchewan	is	$0.86	per	animal	per	day	with	an	average	grazing	period	of	4.9	months	for	cows	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017c).	This	could	suggest	that	survey	respondents	aligned	their	WTA	with	land	rental	rates,	as	the	estimated	mean	and	median	WTA	are	similar	to	the	average	rental	rates	for	cultivated	land	in	Saskatchewan.	The	econometric	results	also	indicated	that	farms	with	greater	land	area,	cattle	based	income,	and	interest	in	conservation	had	lower	WTAs	on	average,	while	the	rancher’s	age,	education,	and	number	of	cattle	increased	WTA	on	average.			 Beyond	estimating	the	average	WTA	for	participating	in	a	conservation	program,	survey	participants	also	suggested	policy	frameworks	they	would	prefer.	Among	the	given	policy	options,	cost-share	programs	were	the	most	preferred	by	a	considerable	margin	with	79%	of	respondents	indicating	it	was	their	most	preferred	policy	structure.	Non-parametric	estimates	from	the	survey	suggest	that	38.3%	to	61.8%	of	costs	would	have	to	be	covered	for	the	average	survey	participant	to	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices	that	could	
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potentially	increase	ecosystem	services.	The	estimates	for	acceptable	cost-share	percentages	and	ranchers’	WTA	for	increasing	ecosystem	services	can	be	compared	to	determine	the	most	cost-effective	means	of	maximizing	participation	in	a	conservation	program	and	therefore	maximizing	the	environmental	benefits	of	the	program.			 Survey	participants	also	suggested	other	policy	structures	including	a	market-based	carbon	credit-trading	program,	tax	relief	for	providing	ecosystem	services,	“results-based”	programs	that	trigger	incentives	for	providing	measurable	ecosystem	services,	and	an	expansion	or	continuation	of	previously	offered	cost-share	programs.	The	comments	given	by	survey	respondents	provided	insights	on	policy	frameworks	ranchers	would	find	acceptable,	and	might	therefore	effectively	encourage	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services.	A	common	theme	among	the	policy	preferences	and	comments	is	that	economic	incentives	would	be	a	key	component	in	the	preferred	policy	frameworks.	These	results	suggest	that	compensation	is	one	of	the	most	important	components	of	any	conservation	program.	Therefore	economic	incentives	are	integral	to	encouraging	rancher	participation	in	conservation	programs.		 As	previously	noted,	the	environmental	impact	and	success	of	a	program	is	highly	dependent	on	producer	uptake	of	the	program.	Along	with	economic	incentives,	additional	survey	results	might	indicate	other	policy	components	that	could	potentially	increase	participation	in	a	conservation	program.	For	example,	Sorice	et	al.	(2013)	and	Ruto	and	Garrod	(2009)	noted	that	landowners	tend	to	prefer	shorter	contracts.	Results	from	this	survey	indicated	that	the	average	maximum	contract	length	survey	participants	would	be	willing	to	agree	to	where	they	would	adopt	management	practices	on	their	land	to	increase	ecosystem	services	was	7.7	years.	Leases	for	former	government	pastures	are	15-year	agreements,	or	roughly	double	what	the	average	survey	participant	was	willing	to	agree	to.	This	suggests	that	shorter	contracts	or	management	agreements	might	increase	participation	or	interest	in	these	leases	and	other	potential	programs.		Claasen,	Cattaneo,	and	Johansson	(2008)	further	note	that	conservation	programs	should	have	a	clearly	defined	environmental	objective.	Aligning	the	environmental	objective	with	landowner	interests	can	potentially	increase	participation	in	a	program,	as	landowners	might	be	more	willing	to	participate	in	a	program	that	supports	environmental	benefits	they	value.	Fifty	seven	percent	of	survey	participants	ranked	water	quality	as	the	most	socially	beneficial	
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ecosystem	service	from	grasslands,	followed	by	wildlife	and	wildlife	habitat	with	33%	of	respondents	ranking	it	first,	and	only	10%	of	respondents	ranked	carbon	sequestration	the	most	beneficial	ecosystem	service	among	the	three.	These	results	suggest	that	conservation	programs	designed	to	promote	water	quality	and	wildlife	habitat	could	be	more	appealing	or	acceptable	to	ranchers	relative	to	programs	promoting	carbon	sequestration.																								
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6.	Conclusion	
6.1	Thesis	Summary			 Grasslands	produce	a	wide	array	of	ecosystem	services	including	food	and	forage,	carbon	sequestration,	air	and	water	quality	maintenance,	biodiversity	and	wildlife	habitat,	nutrient	cycling,	and	pollination	(Kroeger	and	Casey,	2007;	Kulshreshtha	et	al.,	2008).	However	many	of	the	benefits	derived	from	grassland	ecosystem	services	are	public	goods	for	which	private	landowners	and	ranchers	receive	limited	or	no	economic	incentive.	Limited	private	benefits	for	producing	ecosystem	services	could	result	in	under	production	relative	to	the	socially	optimal	output,	as	landowners	will	adopt	management	practices	that	maximize	private	gains	but	not	social	benefits	(Ribaudo	et	al.,	2010).		Therefore	there	is	a	potential	market	failure	in	grassland	management.		 To	address	this,	voluntary	conservation	policies	and	programs	have	been	developed	to	encourage	ranchers	and	landowners	to	adopt	management	practices	that	increase	or	maintain	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services.	The	purpose	of	this	research	was	to	investigate	policy	parameters	acceptable	to	landowners	and	ranchers	to	aid	in	the	design	and	development	of	voluntary	conservation	programs,	as	they	are	only	effective	at	increasing	ecosystem	services	if	producers	opt	in	to	a	program	(Ruto	and	Garrod,	2009;	Sorice	et	al.,	2013).	A	major	objective	was	to	estimate	the	WTA	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	for	participating	in	a	conservation	program	and	adopting	alternative	management	practices.	Adopting	alternative	management	practices	to	increase	ecosystem	services	imposes	costs	on	the	landowner	relative	to	status	quo	management	practices	employed	to	maximize	profit.	These	costs	include	both	explicit	adoption	and	management	costs	as	well	as	opportunity	costs	related	to	foregone	or	lost	production	relative	to	profit	maximizing	output.	It	has	been	commonly	suggested	that	economic	incentives	could	be	required	to	offset	costs	and	encourage	ranchers	to	adopt	management	practices	that	promote	ecosystem	services	(Gao	et	al.,	2016;	Kemp	and	Michalk,	2007;	Kemp	et	al.,	2013;	Klimek	et	al.,	2007;	Narloch,	Drucker,	and	Pascual,	2011).	Therefore	estimating	a	WTA	interval	should	
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aid	in	developing	an	acceptable	and	cost-effective	participation	incentive	to	produce	greater	ecosystem	services.		 A	multi-bounded	payment	card	approach	was	used	for	survey	participants	to	report	their	WTA	for	participating	in	a	hypothetical	conservation	program	that	would	require	a	10%	decrease	in	grazing	intensity.	This	reduction	is	equated	to	a	10%	opportunity	cost	incurred	by	the	rancher	for	participating	in	a	given	program,	and	therefore	the	WTA	amount	they	report	would	offset	a	10%	loss	in	opportunity	costs	from	the	status	quo.	An	interval	estimation	approach	was	then	used	to	econometrically	estimate	a	mean	and	median	WTA	interval	for	an	acceptable	and	cost-effective	participation	incentive.	The	econometric	estimates	for	the	lower	and	upper	bounds	of	the	mean	WTA	interval	among	survey	participants	were	$34.83/acre	and	$42.58/acre,	respectively,	while	the	median	interval	boundary	estimates	were	$32.53/acre	and	$40.08/acre.	The	estimated	WTA	interval	approaches	the	mean	rental	rate	for	cultivated	land	in	Saskatchewan	of	$45.30	per	acre	(Government	of	Saskatchewan,	2017c),	which	would	indicate	that	it	is	a	relatively	large	incentive	payment	for	a	conservation	program.	Extrapolating	the	results	suggests	that	a	participation	incentive	for	a	conservation	program	would	have	to	increase	by	$3.48/acre	to	$4.29/acre	for	every	additional	1%	increase	in	opportunity	costs	incurred	by	the	average	survey	participant	for	them	to	participate	in	a	grassland	conservation	program.		 Survey	results	were	consistent	with	past	suggestions	and	findings	that	economic	incentives	are	an	important	component	of	conservation	programs,	highlighting	the	opportunity	costs	of	ecosystem	services.	The	minimum	WTA	to	participate	in	grassland	conservation	programs	can	be	used	as	a	starting	point	to	developing	policy	options	to	increase	grassland	ecosystem	services.		
6.2	Study	Limitations		
	 The	research	and	analysis	of	this	study	was	limited	by	a	relatively	small	sample	population	compared	to	the	total	number	of	ranchers	in	Saskatchewan.	As	Table	5.1	showed,	it	was	evident	that	the	sample	population	was	not	entirely	a	representative	sample	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers.	Therefore	it	is	it	important	to	keep	the	sample	size,	and	sample	population	characteristics,	in	mind	before	drawing	broad	conclusions	about	the	entirety	of	
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the	Saskatchewan	rancher	population.	However,	the	results	presented	in	this	research	still	provide	useful	insights	and	trends	regarding	rancher	opinions	and	attitudes	towards	grassland	conservation	policy,	ecosystem	services,	and	WTA.	Selection	bias	might	also	be	an	issue	with	the	survey	given	the	method	used	to	invite	the	majority	of	survey	respondents.	Potential	survey	participants	were	typically	found	in	Saskatchewan	cattle	breeder	directories	and	were	then	emailed	a	survey	invitation.	Larger	ranches	and	cattle	operations	are	more	likely	to	advertise	or	have	information	in	breeder	directories,	and	therefore	selection	bias	might	occur	in	having	larger	ranches	participate	in	the	survey.	The	average	survey	respondent’s	ranch	or	farm	was	larger	than	the	average	Saskatchewan	ranch,	in	both	the	number	of	cattle	they	had	and	acres	of	land	they	owned,	rented,	or	leased,	which	might	reflect	this	bias.	Due	to	the	content	and	purpose	of	the	survey,	self-selection	bias	might	also	be	prevalent	as	ranchers	who	are	more	interested	in	ecosystem	services	and	conservation	policies	might	be	more	willing	to	participate	in	the	survey.	For	example,	60%	of	survey	respondents	indicated	they	have	participated	in	a	government	program	in	the	past	such	as	a	BMP	or	other	conservation	program,	suggesting	that	the	majority	of	survey	respondents	look	favorably	towards	conservation	programs	(Table	5.2).	However	this	might	not	be	a	major	issue	as	targeting	and	sampling	ranchers	who	are	favorable	towards	conservation	programs	will	reflect	the	opinions	of	those	who	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	a	conservation	program.	
6.3	Further	Research			 To	expand	on	the	research	of	this	thesis,	a	similar	study	consisting	of	a	larger	sample	could	be	helpful	in	estimating	more	accurate	values	for	WTA	and	determining	the	opportunity	costs	of	increasing	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands.	An	econometric	analysis	of	rancher	WTA	would	benefit	from	a	larger	sample	as	more	consistent	and	accurate	results	could	be	obtained,	both	for	the	coefficients	and	calculated	mean	and	median	WTA.	A	larger	sample	would	also	more	accurately	reflect	the	opinions	of	Saskatchewan	ranchers	regarding	their	willingness	to	participate	in	grassland	conservation	policy,	acceptable	policy	parameters	to	support	participation	in	such	programs,	and	effective	management	practices	for	increasing	ecosystem	services.		
	68	
	 Different	incentives	for	adopting	BMPs	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	private	or	government	leased	grasslands	could	also	be	investigated.	For	example,	economic	incentives	besides	direct	monetary	compensation,	such	as	reduced	lease	or	rental	rates,	could	be	explored	for	grassland	lessees	who	adopt	BMPs	that	would	not	apply	or	be	relevant	to	privately	owned	and	managed	grasslands.	Therefore	a	continuation	of	research	directed	toward	Saskatchewan	ranchers	and	grassland	landowners/lessees	could	be	beneficial	to	conservation	policy	development.		 While	this	research	focuses	on	the	WTA	of	private	ranchers	and	landowners	to	participate	in	conservation	programs	to	increase	ecosystem	services,	researching	the	public’s	opinion	and	value	of	ecosystem	services	could	be	beneficial	to	policy	development	as	well.	Understanding	the	public’s	WTP	for	increasing	ecosystem	services	is	a	critical	part	of	policy	development,	and	balancing	the	WTA	of	private	ranchers	with	the	public’s	WTP	for	ecosystem	services	could	be	beneficial	for	developing	effective	grassland	conservation	policy.	Research	directed	toward	the	public	could	also	focus	on	determining	the	general	public’s	knowledge	of	grassland	ecosystem	services	and	their	expectations	for	ecosystem	services	provision	on	both	private	and	government	leased	grasslands	in	Saskatchewan.		 																			
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Appendix	A:	Grassland	Ecosystem	Services	Survey	
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Grassland	Ecosystem	Services	Survey	
	
	
	
Information	Section	
		 Ecosystem	services	refer	to	the	many	services	provided	by	natural	environments,	including	grassland	and	pasture	ecosystems,	from	which	society	benefits.	Since	people	benefit	from	ecosystem	services,	private	landowners	and	lessees	whose	land	produces	ecosystem	services	are	providing	public	benefits	and	contributing	to	societal	welfare.	Landowners	and	lessees	can	impact	the	total	societal	benefits	derived	from	grasslands	by	adopting	management	practices	that	either	increase	or	decrease	ecosystem	services.			 Grazing	practices	maintain	the	ecosystem	services	that	are	essential	to	the	long-term	vitality,	sustainability,	and	preservation	of	grassland	ecosystems.	Successful	ranching	management	can	also	ensure	that	the	public	will	continue	to	benefit	from	ecosystem	services	derived	from	grasslands	in	the	future.	Ranching	is	therefore	integral	to	conserving	grassland	ecosystems	that	provide	numerous	benefits	to	society.			 Temperate	grasslands,	which	include	Saskatchewan	grasslands,	are	identified	as	the	world’s	most	endangered	ecosystem	by	the	Nature	Conservancy	of	Canada,	and	are	a	priority	for	long-term	conservation.	To	conserve	grasslands	and	increase	ecosystem	services,	policy	tools	have	gained	interest	in	recent	years	as	a	way	to	encourage	agricultural	landowners	to	adopt	environmentally	friendly	management	practices.	These	policies	extend	to	grasslands,	where	they	generally	compensate	landowners	for	adopting	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services	and	conserve	grassland	ecosystems.		 This	survey	will	help	identify	policy	measures	designed	to	maintain	or	increase	ecosystem	services	that	are	acceptable	to	Saskatchewan	ranchers.	The	survey	will	also	investigate	key	policy	points	from	the	perspective	of	ranchers	as	well	as	ranchers’	attitudes	towards	ecosystem	services.			Conservation	policies	that	maintain	or	increase	ecosystem	services	are	usually	voluntary	and	therefore	only	effective	with	producer	participation.	This	means	designing	a	policy	that	ranchers	find	acceptable	is	important	for	any	potential	policy	development.											
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Ecosystem	Services			 The	grassland	ecosystem	services	that	will	be	discussed	in	this	survey	include	carbon	sequestration,	wildlife	and	habitat	conservation,	and	water	quality.		
Carbon	sequestration	involves	the	storage	of	carbon	in	grassland	soils	and	plants,	which	can	contribute	to	the	mitigation	of	climate	change.	This	is	achieved	in	grassland	ecosystems	by	removing	carbon	from	the	atmosphere	through	plant	photosynthesis	and	by	maintaining	the	accumulation	of	carbon	within	plants	and	the	soil.	Carbon	sequestration	also	increases	soil	functions	such	as	water	storage	and	nutrient	cycling.		
Wildlife	and	habitat	conservation	means	sustaining	the	biodiversity	of	all	the	species	of	animals,	birds,	plants,	insects,	and	microorganisms	of	a	grassland	ecosystem.	This	requires	providing	habitat	and	maintaining	viable	populations	for	all	species,	including	those	species	listed	as	endangered	or	at	risk.		
Water	quality	in	grassland	ecosystems	refers	to	grasslands	and	wetlands	filtering	and	removing	pollutants	and	excess	nutrients	from	waterways,	preventing	the	pollution	of	water	sources	such	as	wetlands,	lakes,	sloughs,	and	streams,	maintaining	water	levels,	and	maintaining	the	supply	and	quality	of	groundwater	to	dugouts	and	flowing	springs.		
	
Policy	Alternatives			 The	policy	options	designed	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	include	extension	programs,	cost	share	programs,	and	conservation	easements.	Each	policy	measure	is	designed	to	maintain	or	increase	ecosystem	services	by	encouraging	conservation	management	practices	such	as	fencing	off	environmentally	sensitive	areas	from	livestock	or	altering	grazing	practices.	All	policy	options	discussed	in	this	survey	are	voluntary	in	that	the	landowner	can	choose	whether	or	not	to	participate	in	the	program.			 Extension	Programs	–	The	government	or	a	conservation	organization	provides	free	information	about	the	benefits	of	grassland	and	grazing	management	practices	that	maintain	or	increase	ecosystem	services.	Ranchers	and	grassland	landowners	may	then	choose	whether	or	not	to	voluntarily	implement	the	management	practices.		
Cost	share	programs	–	A	subsidy	where	the	government	refunds	participants	a	portion	of	the	management	costs	they	voluntarily	undertake	to	maintain	or	increase	ecosystem	services.	The	cost-share	would	be	a	one-time	payment	to	the	participant	for	each	approved	management	action	or	development	the	participant	undertakes.		
	 Conservation	Easement	–	A	voluntary	legal	agreement	between	a	landowner	and	government	or	conservation	agency	that	permanently	limits	how	the	land	may	be	used,	for	example	prohibiting	any	kind	of	development	on	the	land,	in	order	to	protect	its	conservation	values	and	provide	ecosystem	services.	How	landowners	are	compensated	can	vary	based	on	the	structure	of	the	agreement,	but	landowners	are	most	commonly	
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compensated	through	tax	benefits.	Conservation	easements	can	be	personalized	to	each	individual	landowner	to	meet	their	needs	while	still	meeting	some	conservation	objective.	The	landowner	still	retains	ownership	and	the	right	to	use	the	land	for	ranching	purposes.	If	the	landowner	were	to	choose	to	sell	the	land	under	the	agreement,	the	conservation	easement	still	holds	for	any	new	landowner.																																											
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Survey	Questions	
	
i.	Policy	Questions	
	 1. Suppose	the	government	wanted	to	encourage	ranchers	to	adopt	management	practices	that	increase	carbon	sequestration	on	grasslands.	Assume	the	government	is	going	to	implement	some	policy	measure	(no	policy	is	not	an	option).	How	would	you	rank	the	following	three	policy	options	in	order	of	which	you	prefer	most	or	would	most	likely	participate	in,	1	being	most	preferable	and	3	being	least	preferable?					a) Extension	Program:		 	 	b) Cost	Share	Program:		 	 	c) Conservation	Easement:		 		 2. Is	there	a	type	of	policy	or	program	not	mentioned	in	question	#1	that	you	would	prefer	to	have	available	to	you	that	would	encourage	management	practices	which	would	lead	to	increased	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands?											
Please	answer	questions	3	through	5	from	your	own	personal	perspective.		3. If	I	had	more	information	on	grassland	and	grazing	management	practices	that	could	potentially	increase	ecosystem	services,	I	would	adopt	these	management	practices	voluntarily.	
	a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree		 4. It	is	easy	to	find	out	about	current	environmental	and	beneficial	management	practice	(BMP)	programs	offered	by	the	government	or	other	conservation	agencies.		
	a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree	
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	5. I’m	willing	to	take	on	additional	paperwork	and	administrative	duties,	such	as	information	gathering	and	recording,	to	participate	in	an	ecosystem	services	conservation	policy.			a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree		 6. Suppose	the	government	implemented	a	cost-share	subsidy	to	encourage	ranchers	to	install	fencing	so	they	could	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices	to	enhance	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands.	By	participating	in	the	cost-share	subsidy,	you	would	incur	private	costs	for	fencing	materials,	installation,	and	labor,	which	the	subsidy	would	cover	a	portion	of.	How	would	the	following	levels	of	compensation	offered	affect	the	likelihood	of	you	participating	in	the	cost-share	subsidy	and	installing	fencing	to	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices?		Cost	Percentage	Covered	by	the	Government	 Definitely	Not	Participate	 Probably	Not	Participate	 Probably	Participate	 Definitely	Participate	10%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	20%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	30%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	40%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	50%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	60%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	70%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	80%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	90%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 	100%	Cost	Share	 	 	 	 				 7. How	many	additional	hours	of	labor	per	week	would	you	be	willing	to	work	to	adopt	rotational	grazing	practices	and	participate	in	the	subsidy	program	described	in	question	#6?	Additional	labor	would	include	installing	fencing	and	moving	cattle	between	grazing	paddocks	once	a	week.			 	 	 		8. What	is	the	maximum	length	of	an	agreement,	in	years,	in	which	you	would	adopt	management	practices	on	your	land	to	increase	ecosystem	services?		 	 	 	 	
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ii.	Ecosystem	Services	Questions	
	 1. How	would	you	rank	the	following	ecosystem	services	that	are	produced	on	native	grassland	and	pasture	ecosystems	in	order	of	how	beneficial	they	are	to	society,	1	being	the	most	beneficial	and	3	the	least	beneficial?		 a) Carbon	sequestration:		 	 	b) Wildlife	and	habitat	conservation:		 	 	c) Water	quality:		 	 		
Please	answer	questions	2	through	6	from	your	own	personal	perspective.		 2. In	my	opinion,	my	current	management	practices	are	effective	at	providing	the	following	ecosystem	services:		a) Carbon	sequestration:			i) Strongly	disagree	ii) Disagree		iii) Agree		iv) Strongly	agree		 b) Wildlife	and	habitat	preservation:			i) Strongly	disagree		ii) Disagree		iii) Agree		iv) Strongly	agree		 c) Water	quality:			i) Strongly	disagree	ii) Disagree		iii) Agree		iv) Strongly	agree			 3. Would	you	consider	changing	management	practices	if	it	increased	ecosystem	services?		a)	Yes						b)	No											
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3.b)	Why	did	you	answer	yes/no?										 4. Pasture	and	grassland	landowners	and	lessees	have	a	responsibility	to	use	management	practices	that	conserve	or	enhance	ecosystem	services	on	their	land.			a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree	
	 5. I	would	be	willing	to	reduce	my	cattle	grazing	stocking	rate,	meaning	decrease	the	number	of	animal	units	per	acre	on	my	land,	if	it	would	increase	ecosystem	services	on	my	land.			a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree		 6. The	government	should	provide	monetary	compensation	to	grassland/pasture	landowners	and	lessees	for	producing	and	conserving	ecosystem	services	on	their	land.			a)	Strongly	disagree	b)	Disagree	c)	Agree	d)	Strongly	agree	
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iii.	Willingness-to-Accept	Questions		Assume	the	government	created	a	monetary	subsidy	that	supported	ranchers	to	implement	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands	and	pastures.	By	implementing	the	management	practices,	the	rancher	may	incur	additional	costs	or	forego	income	from	a	loss	in	production.		 1. Would	you	be	willing	to	decrease	your	grazing	intensity	by	10%	to	increase	ecosystem	services	on	your	land	for	a	subsidy	payment	of:		Payment	Amount	 Definitely	Not		 Probably	Not		 Probably		 Definitely		$1/acre	 	 	 	 	$5/acre	 	 	 	 	$10/acre	 	 	 	 	$20/acre	 	 	 	 	$30/acre	 	 	 	 	$40/acre	 	 	 	 	$50/acre	 	 	 	 	$60/acre	 	 	 	 	$70/acre	 	 	 	 	$80/acre	 	 	 	 	$90/acre	 	 	 	 	$100/acre	 	 	 	 	
	2.	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage?		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	3.	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	the	quantity	of	wildlife	and	wildlife	habitat?									
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4.	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	water	quality?										
	
iv.	Demographics	
	 1. How	many	head	of	cattle	do	you	own?		 	 	 	 		2. How	many	acres	of	land	do	you	use	for	raising	cattle	(grazing,	growing	feed,	other	uses)	that	is:			 a) Owned?		 	 		b) Rented/leased?		 	 	 	 	 		 3. For	how	many	years	have	you	been	raising	cattle?	
	 	 	 	 		4. Did	you	use	pastures	that	were	formerly	owned	and	managed	by	either	the	federal	or	provincial	government?			a)	Yes							b)	No		 5. Do	you	plan	on	leasing	formerly	government	owned	grasslands/pastures?		a)	Yes						b)	No		6. Have	you	or	do	you	use	or	participate	in	any	government	offered	BMP	programs?		 a)	Yes					(Please	specify:		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	)	b)	No											
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7. What	percentage	of	your	total	income	is	derived	from	cattle	production?			a)	0-19%	b)	20-39%	c)	40-59%	d)	60-79%	e)	80-100%		 8. What	percentage	of	your	total	income	is	off-farm	income?		a)	0-19%	b)	20-39%	c)	40-59%	d)	60-79%	e)	80-100%		9. Approximately	how	many	more	years	do	you	plan	on	ranching?	Do	you	have	a	succession	plan	in	place	for	your	cattle	operation	if	and	when	you	are	done	ranching?	If	yes,	what	is	it	(sell,	pass	onto	family	member,	etc.)?		Years:	 	 	 											Yes	or	No							IF	Yes:		 	 	 	 	 								10. Do	you	have	any	surface	water,	such	as	a	lake,	stream,	or	slough,	present	within	your	pasture	system?		a)	Yes						b)	No		 11. 		What	is	your	age?		a)	29	or	less	b)	30-39	c)	40-49		d)	50-59		e)	60	or	over		12. What	is	the	highest	level	of	education	you	have	completed?			a) Less	than	grade	12	b) Grade	12	c)	Some	post	secondary	education	d)	Post	secondary	degree/certificate/diploma	attained		e)	Graduate	degree		
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13. 	Gender?			 	 	 	 	 		 14. What	rural	municipality	number	is	your	home	ranch	located	in?			 	 	 	 	 	
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Appendix	B:	Survey	Comments	
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Question:	Is	there	a	type	of	policy	or	program	not	mentioned	in	question	#1	that	you	would	prefer	to	have	available	to	you	that	would	encourage	management	practices	which	would	lead	to	increased	ecosystem	services	on	grasslands?		
Responses:		 1.	 Being	paid	for	programs	under	Growing	Forward	1	that	aren't	under	Growing	Forward	2	such	as	windbreaks,	cross-fencing,	and	seeding	sensitive	lands.	2.	 If	the	public	wants	ecosystem	services	and	to	keep	native	grasslands,	should	"put	their	money	where	their	mouth	is",	pay	for	them	and	make	ranching	a	profitable	option.	3.	 Keep	water	infrastructure	program	in	place,	encourage	assistance/cost	share	on	cross-fencing,	assistance	for	fencing	new	areas	not	currently	used	for	agriculture,	and	re-establish	unproductive	lands	(incentives	should	be	in	place).	4.	 A	program	that	offered	a	percentage	tax	break/relief	if	you	met	a	certain	environmental	criteria	on	your	grassland,	a	measurable	conservation	goal	relative	to	starting	conditions.	Would	get	relief	based	on	how	many	goals	you	meet.	Needs	to	be	universal,	voluntary,	flexible,	and	reasonable.	5.	 Don’t	necessarily	want	to	be	paid	for	carbon	sequestration	or	other	services,	but	don’t	want	it	to	cost	anything	either	to	operate,	some	sort	of	recognition	could	work.	6.	 Habitat	banking	--	selling	habitat	credits	to	others	based	on	how	many	at-risk	species	you	protect	on	your	land	(market	based	approach	of	buying/selling	credits,	better	managed	grass	has	more	credits).	7.	 Landowners	should	have	more	say	in	wildlife	management,	more	control.	8.	 No	oil/gas	production	in	foothills/mountain	areas,	keep	cattle	away	from	water	sources.	9.	 Prefer	that	the	conservation	and	carbon	sequestration	policy	be	added	into	existing	frameworks,	such	as	the	Environmental	Farm	Plan	or	Saskatchewan	Verified	Beef,	as	they	already	have	some	of	the	basic	info	on	the	programs	and	would	avoid	redundancy	and	extra	unwanted	paperwork	or	office	time.	10.	 Would	be	beneficial	to	have	a	program,	not	through	the	gov't	but	through	another	organization,	to	put	some	money	towards	the	purchase	of	land	that	is	going	to	be	used	for	pasture	or	hay	production	to	allow	producers	to	be	competitive	with	grain	producers.	11.	 If	they	bill	ranchers	for	cows	through	carbon	tax,	should	have	a	cost	sharing	thing	that	is	a	net	benefit	to	ranchers.	
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12.	 Exemption	from	proposed	carbon	taxes.	13.	 NO.	14.	 Incentives.				15.	 Not	in	favour	of	government	programs	for	the	most	part.				16.	 Interested	in	"results-based"	programs.	Different	from	cost	share	in	that	it	doesn’t	provide	a	reimbursement,	rather	it	pays	producers	for	maintaining	a	specific	set	of	habitat	parameters,	for	example	"healthy"	range	health	or	specific	habitat	targets	for	wildlife.	Only	triggers	rewards	when	the	targets	are	met,	it	doesn’t	allow	for	penalties	if	targets	are	not	met.	17.	 A	carbon	credit	payment	–	similar	to	how	cultivated	land	credits	are	traded.	18.	 Combination	of	extension	and	cost-share.	19.	 I	would	like	to	be	paid	on	an	acre	basis	for	wildlife	habitat	conservation	in	functioning	wetlands,	streams,	and	treed	areas.	This	payment	would	be	yearly	and	encourage	farmers,	like	myself,	to	maintain	these	areas	while	the	area	around	us	has	been	heavily	drained	and	into	annual	crop	production.	Funding	for	seeding	cover	crops,	polyculture	crop	mixes,	and	perennial	forage	as	well	as	implementing	rotational	grazing	systems	and	watering	systems	is	a	must!	20.	 Create	a	program	similar	to	carbon	credits	for	farming.			 		 		 		 	
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Question:	Why	would	you	consider	changing	management	practices	if	it	increased	ecosystem	services?		
Responses:		 1.	 For	good	of	future	generations,	wildlife,	and	the	good	for	everyone	in	general.	2.	 Right	thing	to	do,	ranchers	are	the	initial	stewards	of	wildlife	and	land.	3.	 For	sustainability.	4.	 If	I	increase	ecosystem	services,	it	will	increase	net	profits/benefits	in	the	end	as	a	producer	over	time.	5.	 Healthy	ecosystem	beneficial	for	everybody,	better	I	treat	the	land	the	better	I	am	as	well.	6.	 Do	the	right	thing,	as	long	as	it	doesn’t	hurt	financial	situation.	7.	 "Consider"	--	I'd	be	open	to	what	might	be	needed.	8.	 Always	looking	to	improve	habitat	quality	and	environment	for	conservation	purposes.	9.	 Just	a	good	thing	to	do,	beneficial	in	the	end.	10.	 Answered	no	-	happy	with	way	things	are.	11.	 Ranch	health	is	all	encompassing,	systems	and	management	practices	that	affect	the	ecosystem	undoubtedly	will	have	a	positive	impact	on	range	health,	cattle,	soil,	and	water	quality.	As	such,	our	ranch	see	ecosystem	and	ranch	management	as	complimentary	practices.	12.	 Already	do	some	environmentally	friendly	practices	like	fencing	off	dugouts,	would	like	to	do	more	rotational	grazing,	other	practices	as	we	see	fit.	13.	 What’s	good	for	the	environment	is	good	for	everyone/everything.	14.	 Increased	herd	health	from	better	water	and	grass	quality.	Healthier	and	more	sustainable	land/soils.	15.	 Everyone	needs	to	get	involved	in	improving	environment.	16.	 For	the	betterment	of	land	and	its	production	in	not	only	my	operation	now	but	also	into	the	future,	and	also	to	protect	the	value	of	the	resource.	17.	 If	changing	management	practices	increased	ecosystem	services	without	negatively	affecting	utilization	of	the	resource	we	would	likely	consider	it.	
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18.	 Believe	it	is	important.	19.	 Because	we	believe	healthier	ecosystems	means	cleaner	water	for	your	livestock,	healthy	grasslands	and	improved	habitat	for	wildlife;	Habitat	important	to	us.	20.	 Increases	grass.	21.	 Our	management	practices	already	contemplate	maximizing	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services.	That	said,	as	stewards	of	the	environment,	we	would	consider	changing	management	practices	that	increase	ecosystem	services,	particularly	if	there	was	economic	benefit.	22.	 As	a	landowner	you	have	responsibility	to	operate	the	land	in	the	best	interest	of	all	species	that	depend	on	that	land	for	survival,	operate	in	the	best	interest	of	all	and	consider	how	your	actions	impact	everything.	23.	 Answered	no	-	most	of	what	we	do	now	is	to	increase	water	quality.	24.	 A	strong	ecosystem	is	a	resilient	ecosystem	and	better	able	to	withstand	climatic	variation.	That	hopefully	would	lead	to	financial	stability	as	well	on	our	operation,	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	sustaining	our	ranch	for	future	generations.	25.	 We	are	working	towards	selling	more	Ecosystem	goods	and	services	and	believe	that	there	is	a	market	for	these	directly	or	as	an	attribute	of	our	product	(eg:	direct	beef	sales).	As	well,	environmental	improvements	also	relate	to	greater	production	and	profitability	in	our	business	since	we	are	focused	heavily	on	grazing.	26.	 Any	improvement	in	ecosystem	services	is	worth	attempting.	27.	 We	already	have	and	are	already	operating	our	farm	to	increase	soil	health	and	long-term	sustainability	of	our	operation.	Help	from	the	government	on	this	would	be	great	to	encourage	our	farm	to	adopt	these	practices	quicker	and	encourage	other	farmers/ranchers	to	adopt	sustainable	agricultural	practices.	28.	 Although	I	feel	I	am	doing	the	best	possible	as	a	land	manager,	I	feel	that	there	is	always	room	for	improvement	no	matter	how	good	of	job	you	are	doing.	With	research	there	might	be	more	information	that	I	might	be	able	to	incorporate	into	our	operation.		29.	 As	a	mother	and	grandmother	who's	family	is	involved	in	farming	and	ranching	I	want	our	grasslands	and	croplands	to	provide	them	with	a	safe	and	good	lifestyle.		 	
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Question:	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage?		
	
Responses:	
	 1.	 Greater	rotation.	2.	 Timing	of	grazing,	leaving	thatch	to	avoid	erosion.	3.	 Better	grass	management	through	rotational,	bale	grazing;	increase	organic	matter.	4.	 Leaving	more	cover,	fencing	out	water	holes,	more	grass	the	better.	5.	 Would	be	willing	to	do	things	if	they	work	for	the	operation,	rotational	graze	somewhat	already.	6.	 Different	ways	of	producing	feed,	no	till,	permanent	cover.	7.	 Reseeding	low	productive	areas.	8.	 Already	doing	best	we	can.	9.	 Responsible	grazing.		10.	 Don’t	overgraze.	11.	 Relay	cropping	for	extended	grazing	season,	continued	and	improved	reduced	till	systems	for	winter	feed	options,	high	intensity/low	duration	grazing	management	practices,	new	forage	varieties.	12.	 Rotational	grazing.	13.	 Rotation	grazing;	planting	permanent	grass/hay	on	marginal	soils;	rejuvenate	pastures	to	reduce	invasive	weeds.	14.	 Need	more	info	on	options.	15.	 Already	take	action.	16.	 More	rotational	grazing,	longer	rest	times	between	grazing.	17.	 Late	grazing	of	native	grass.	18.	 Using	cover	crops,	annual	crops.	19.	 Proper	grazing	techniques.	20.	 Makes	best	economic	sense	to	maximize	carbon	sequestration	and	storage,	would	implement	further	fencing	and	direct	seeding/reduced	soil	disturbance	should	reseeding	be	required.	21.	 More	grass	seeding	on	marginal	land	and	reduced	tillage.	22.	 Don’t	believe	there's	anything	more	we	could	do.	
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23.	 Need	to	see	some	carbon	storage	data	and	do	some	benchmarking	on	my	pastures	to	determine	which	pastures	I	think	would	increase	soil	carbon,	not	sure	if	any	changes	to	current	regime	would	make	a	real	difference.	24.	 Many	have	been	adopted,	but	we	would	increase	our	intensive	rotation	into	more	difficult	to	access	areas.		We	would	be	unlikely	to	reduce	the	intensity	of	grazing	(more	likely	to	increase)	on	a	square	footage	basis,	but	would	extend	the	duration	between	grazing.	25.	 Adaptive	grazing,	cover	crops,	bale	grazing.	26.	 Cover	crops,	polyculture	mixes,	seeding	to	good	perennial	forage	mix,	different	crops	in	rotation,	reducing	straw	use	or	buying	straw,	reducing	fertilizer	use	through	using	more	diverse	mixes	and	intercropping,	rotational	grazing,	growing	legumes,	no-till…	we	already	do	all	this.	I	would	just	like	to	be	paid	to	NOT	drain	and	NOT	plough	down	sloughs	and	trees	on	our	land,	which	covers	around	20%	of	our	land	base.	27.	 I	currently	practice	rest	rotation	grazing.	I	would	be	willing	to	consider	other	grazing	strategies	to	increase	carbon	sequestration	and	storage.		 	
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Question:	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	the	quantity	of	wildlife	and	wildlife	habitat?		
Responses:		 1.	 Cutting	hay	later	in	season.	2.	 Don’t	know	how	to	increase,	wildlife	already	in	good	state.	3.	 Winter	grazing	systems.	4.	 Already	good,	don’t	know	what	we	could	do	to	make	better,	perhaps	better	seasonal	hunting.	5.	 Already	good,	what	we’re	doing	now	is	working.	6.	 Don’t	allow	hunting,	but	not	many	management	changes	you	could	do	to	increase.	7.	 Reseeding	and	fertilizer	application.	8.	 Limit	hunting	and	try	not	to	ruin	water	sources/quality.	9.	 Don’t	do	anything	now	to	decrease	it,	don’t	clear	bush.	10.	 Don’t	overgraze.	11.	 Riparian	management,	riparian	restorations,	grazing	management,	wildlife	friendly	fencing.	12.	 Produce	more	grass.	13.	 Rotation	grazing	and	fencing	off	waterways.	14.	 Fence	off	riparian	areas,	limit	hunting	access,	putting	out	waterfowl	nests.	15.	 Already	take	actions.	16.	 Leave	more	natural	standing	trees	in	place	rather	than	transfer	into	farmable,	seedable	land.	17.	 Not	sure.	18.	 Appropriate	stocking	rates	for	diverse	ecosystems	and	need.	19.	 Proper	grazing	techniques,	like	rotational	grazing,	so	wildlife	have	access	to	healthier	grasslands.	20.	 Rotational	grazing,	late	hay	cutting.	21.	 Already	fence	out	pastureland,	don’t	use	ammonia,	proper	wildlife	strategies	should	be	directed	and	implemented	by	government,	one-off	strategies	rarely	effective	and	overly	burdensome.	22.	 Grass	seeding,	delayed	hay	cutting	or	grazing,	and	leaving	some	brush.	
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23.	 Do	everything	already,	wild	animals	more	or	less	have	free	reign.	24.	 Some	practices	outlined	in	Environment	and	Climate	Change	Canada's	Species	at	Risk	Plans	may	be	useful.	25.	 Season	of	use,	intensity	(stock	density),	augmentation	of	habitat	(eg:	planting	pollinators/trees).	26.	 Adaptive	grazing,	cover	crops,	bale	grazing.	27.	 Not	having	to	drain	or	push	down	treed	areas.	28.	 I	would	like	to	have	temporary	fencing	that	can	be	taken	down	for	moose/elk.	Currently	I	struggle	with	moose/elk	taking	fences	out	in	the	fall.	If	there	was	a	way	for	fences	to	be	taken	down	in	the	fall	&	put	up	in	the	spring,	it’s	labour	intensive	but	so	is	fixing	fence	constantly.		 	
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Question:	What	management	practice	or	practices	would	you	be	willing	to	adopt	on	your	land	that	you	believe	would	increase	water	quality?		
Responses:		
	 1.	 Need	windbreaks.	2.	 Don’t	know	how	to	increase.	3.	 Keep	cattle	out	of	water	any	way	you	can.	4.	 Keep	cattle	away	from	water	runs,	don’t	feed	in	those	areas.	5.	 Better	dugout	management,	pumping	water	out.	6.	 Maintain	water	quality	by	having	protected	water	source	then	pumping	water	to	where	it’s	needed.	7.	 Prevent	erosion,	buffer	zones	between	grass	and	water,	limit	access	to	water	from	domestic	animals,	don’t	allow	free	access	to	waterway.	8.	 Fencing	off	dugouts	and	pumping	them.	9.	 Fence	out	water	system/supply.	10.	 Remote	water	systems.	11.	 Fencing	dugouts	and	water	systems.	12.	 Exclusion	fencing	of	water,	remote	watering	systems,	and	developing	water	sources.	13.	 Fencing	off	groundwater	access	areas,	increase	use	of	solar	pumping	stations,	improve	drainage.	14.	 Fence	dugouts.	15.	 Leave	more	natural	tree	populations,	rest	periods	between	grazing,	solar	pump	water	out	of	lowlands	and	dugouts.	16.	 Not	sure.	17.	 Already	drilled	wells,	fenced	waterways,	installed	solar	water	systems.	18.	 Ensure	livestock	have	limited	access	to	water	sources	to	minimize	water	quality	degradation.	19.	 Rotational	grazing,	fencing,	grass	seeding.	20.	 Have	already	fenced	water	bodies	and	use	solar	trough,	would	be	willing	to	upgrade	watering	systems	if	a	better	option	became	available.	21.	 Remote	watering	and	fencing	off	riparian	areas.	22.	 Look	after	water	already.	
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23.	 Pumping	water	out	of	dams	and	offsite	to	cattle	into	troughs	would	be	helpful.	Measure	water	quality	regularly.	24.	 Off	site	watering,	fencing	more	riparian	areas,	changing	season	of	use.	25.	 Adaptive	grazing,	cover	crops,	bale	grazing.	26.	 Not	having	to	drain	or	push	down	treed	areas.	27.	 I	would	like	to	have	off-site	water	stations	and	sloughs	fenced	off.	As	well	as	a	fence	along	our	1/4	mile	of	lake	shore.		 	
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General	Comments	
	 1.	 Have	to	know	where	to	look	to	find	programs,	and	better	ways	to	meet	goals	than	reducing	stocking	rates/grazing	intensity.	2.	 Don't	believe	reducing	stocking	rate	is	true	method,	"a	misnomer",	prefer	flexibility	for	contract	length,	too	many	current	barriers	(paperwork)	in	current	cost	share	programs.	3.	 Conservation	easement	distant	third	for	program	rankings,	and	too	busy	to	do	additional	paperwork.	4.	 Important	to	have	succession	plan,	wouldn’t	go	over	60%	cost	share	because	rancher	should	have	“skin	in	the	game”,	info	on	programs	is	there	but	you	have	to	seek	it,	need	to	recognize	asset	of	native	grasslands/prairie	to	society	as	a	whole,	grasslands	neglected	for	a	long	time	in	the	past,	need	policies	that	use	sound	economics	to	protect	grasslands,	find	something	acceptable	to	ranchers	and	public,	although	many	people	don’t	want	government	involvement.	5.	 Not	sure	if	I	want	to	be	paid	for	providing	ecosystem	services,	just	don’t	want	it	to	cost	money,	but	not	sure	if	monetary	compensation	is	right	way	to	do	it.	Changing	management	practices	depends	the	private	effects,	limited	contract	length	because	there's	always	new	information.	6.	 Cattle	people	are	good	conservationists,	but	when	it	comes	down	to	it	you	have	to	look	after	yourself,	need	some	financial	incentive	or	reason	to	do	certain	practices.	7.	 Need	compensation	in	order	to	lower	stocking	rate,	margins	are	too	tight	on	cattle.	8.	 Long	lasting	relationship	between	large	animals	and	grasslands,	long	ago	buffalo	and	now	cows,	that	contributes	to	range	health,	there	have	always	been	large	animals	on	grasslands.	Most	operations	are	not	doing	things	that	harm	the	environment	anyways,	they	manage	the	land	responsibly.	Easements	take	decision	making	away	from	rancher.	Ultimately	ranchers	need	to	make	ends	meet.	Government	not	good	at	letting	people	know	of	opportunities	and	programs	out	there.	Already	do	high	intensity/	low	frequency	grazing.	Don’t	know	enough	about	carbon	sequestration	personally;	would	make	management	changes	as	long	as	it	doesn’t	take	away	from	bottom	line.	Prefer	high	intensity	grazing	for	short	duration	as	grazing	method,	and	then	move	between	areas	often.	If	charging	for	hurting	environment,	should	also	give	back	if	improving	environment.	9.	 Difficult	to	find	out	about	programs,	need	more	outreach.	If	asking	for	more	work	from	rancher	and	higher	costs,	need	to	pay	for	it.	
	99	
10.	 Noted	they	are	a	5th	generation	rancher	for	ranch	experience.	11.	 Don’t	believe	we	overgraze	now.	12.	 Noted	that	ranchers	already	forego	income	by	choosing	to	maintain	grasslands	instead	of	farming	for	crops	on	it.	Require	more	details	on	potentially	decreasing	stocking	rate,	healthy	ranges	will	have	a	mosaic	of	high,	medium,	and	low	patches	of	grazing	level,	don't	see	how	a	general	blanket	reduction	in	stocking	rate	could	increase	ecosystem	services.	Who	is	the	responsibility	to	manage	grasslands	responsibly	to?	To	society,	their	self,	bankers	or	lenders?	Number	of	additional	work	hours	dependent	on	ability	to	provide	or	move	water	to	livestock,	depending	on	cross	fencing	could	take	20-30	additional	hours	to	move	water	to	some	parts,	5-10	to	others.	Will	cross	fencing	actually	meet	the	goals?	What	is	the	goal,	and	what	would	I	do	for	water?	Could	effect	producers	in	different	regions	differently,	and	may	not	address	root	problem,	just	installing	fencing	for	the	sake	of	doing	it.	Cross	fence	policy	doesn’t	seem	that	effective	to	me,	would	caution	against	policies	that	encourage	practices	like	this.	13.	 Farm	has	been	raising	cattle	over	100	years.	Have	already	extensively	deployed	intensively	managed	grazing	systems;	Didn't	answer	labour,	inapplicable	as	already	did	those	practices.	14.	 Overgrazing	is	not	a	function	of	stocking	rate	but	of	time,	very	few	pastures	are	overstocked,	and	a	decrease	in	rate	only	leads	to	selective	overgrazing/partial	over	rest.	Same	answer	for	management	practices	because	they	are	all	tied	together	and	can't	be	managed	separately.	15.	 Didn't	answer	additional	labour	since	already	implemented	rotational	grazing.	16.	 Didn't	answer	several	questions	since	our	land	is	rented	out	to	other	livestock	producers,	don’t	ranch	much	ourselves	anymore.	Felt	some	questions	were	inapplicable	because	of	this,	would	have	to	come	to	a	management	and	monetary	agreement	beforehand	with	the	renter.	More	information	about	carbon	sequestration	needs	to	be	provided	to	producers.	Feels	good	programs	and	practices	are	in	place	for	wildlife.	Effectiveness	of	management	practices	and	grassland	health	relies	heavily	on	amount	of	rainfall	and	snowfall	throughout	the	year.		 		 	
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Appendix	C:	Raw	Data	
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ID	 PREF_EXTENSION	 PREF_COSTSHARE	 PREF_EASE	 VOL_ADOPT	 SEARCH_COST	1	 2	 3	 1	 4	 3	2	 2	 3	 1	 4	 2.5	3	 2	 3	 1	 4	 3	4	 1	 3	 2	 3	 3	5	 3	 2	 1	 3	 3	6	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	7	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	8	 1	 2	 3	 3	 2	9	 1	 3	 2	 3	 3	10	 1.5	 3	 1.5	 3	 2	11	 3	 2	 1	 1	 2	12	 1.5	 3	 1.5	 3	 3	13	 1.5	 3	 1.5	 4	 2.5	14	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	15	 2	 3	 1	 3	 2	16	 2	 3	 1	 3	 2	17	 1	 3	 2	 3	 3	18	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	19	 3	 2	 1	 4	 2	20	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	21	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	22	 2	 3	 1	 3	 2	23	 2	 3	 1	 3	 4	24	 2	 3	 1	 3	 2	25	 3	 2	 1	 2	 3	26	 2	 3	 1	 1	 2	27	 2	 3	 1	 3	 3	28	 3	 2	 1	 4	 2	29	 1	 3	 2	 3	 2	30	 	 	 	 3	 3				
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ID	 TRAN_COST	 MIN_COSTSHARE_PROB	 MIN_COSTSHARE_DEF	 LABOR	1	 4	 50	 60	 8	2	 3	 20	 50	 7	3	 1	 40	 70	 3	4	 3	 30	 50	 5	5	 3	 50	 80	 2	6	 2	 50	 60	 10	7	 2	 40	 70	 1	8	 3	 50	 70	 10	9	 3	 50	 80	 2	10	 2	 30	 50	 10	11	 3	 50	 70	 6	12	 2	 60	 60	 5	13	 2.5	 10	 10	 7	14	 2	 50	 70	 2	15	 2	 40	 50	 2	16	 3	 50	 80	 2	17	 3	 50	 60	 10	18	 2	 10	 50	 2	19	 3	 40	 50	 5	20	 3	 10	 	 4	21	 3	 50	 80	 3	22	 2	 40	 50	 4	23	 2	 50	 80	 4	24	 1	 70	 100	 2	25	 4	 30	 30	 10	26	 2	 10	 70	 	27	 4	 40	 80	 10	28	 3	 10	 50	 5	29	 3	 30	 50	 	30	 	 	 	 	
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ID	 CON_LENGTH	 C_SEQ	 WILDLIFE	 WATER_QUALITY	 PROVIDE_CSEQ	 	1	 10	 3	 1	 2	 4	 	2	 15	 2	 3	 1	 4	 	3	 5	 1	 2	 3	 3	 	4	 20	 2	 1	 3	 3	 	5	 5	 2	 3	 1	 3	 	6	 10	 1	 3	 2	 3	 	7	 5	 1	 3	 2	 3	 	8	 3	 2	 1	 3	 3	 	9	 10	 1.5	 1.5	 3	 3	 	10	 5	 1	 2	 3	 3	 	11	 5	 1	 2	 3	 4	 	12	 3	 2	 3	 1	 3	 	13	 3	 1	 2	 3	 4	 	14	 10	 2	 1	 3	 3	 	15	 5	 1	 2	 3	 2	 	16	 2	 3	 1	 2	 4	 	17	 15	 2	 1	 3	 3	 	18	 3	 1	 2	 3	 3	 	19	 1	 1	 3	 2	 3	 	20	 10	 1	 2	 3	 3	 	21	 10	 1	 3	 2	 3	 	22	 5	 1	 3	 2	 3	 	23	 10	 1	 2	 3	 3	 	24	 10	 1	 2	 3	 2	 	25	 10	 1	 3	 2	 4	 	26	 10	 3	 1	 2	 4	 	27	 10	 2	 3	 1	 4	 	28	 3	 1	 2	 3	 1	 	29	 10	 1	 2	 3	 4	 	30	 	 1	 2	 3	 	 														
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ID	 PROVIDE_WILDLIFE	 PROVIDE_WATERQ	 VOL_CHANGE	 RESPONSIBILITY	1	 4	 3	 1	 4	2	 4	 4	 1	 4	3	 4	 4	 1	 4	4	 3	 4	 1	 4	5	 4	 3	 1	 4	6	 4	 3	 1	 4	7	 3	 3	 1	 4	8	 3	 3	 1	 3	9	 3	 3	 1	 3	10	 3	 3	 0	 3	11	 3	 3	 1	 4	12	 3	 4	 1	 3	13	 4	 4	 1	 3	14	 3	 2	 1	 3	15	 3	 2	 1	 3	16	 3	 3	 1	 3	17	 3	 3	 1	 4	18	 3	 3	 1	 3	19	 3	 3	 1	 3	20	 3	 3	 1	 3	21	 4	 3	 1	 3	22	 3	 3	 1	 3	23	 4	 4	 1	 4	24	 3	 4	 0	 3	25	 4	 3	 1	 3	26	 4	 4	 1	 4	27	 3	 4	 1	 4	28	 1	 1	 1	 3	29	 4	 4	 1	 4	30	 3	 3	 1	 3														
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ID	 VOL_REDUCE	 GOV_SUPPORT	 WTA	(PROBABLY)	 WTA	(DEFINITELY)	1	 2	 4	 40	 100	2	 2	 4	 20	 30	3	 2	 3	 20	 50	4	 3	 3	 5	 10	5	 2	 2.5	 40	 50	6	 3	 4	 20	 60	7	 1	 2	 50	 80	8	 3	 3	 50	 70	9	 2	 3	 20	 50	10	 2	 3	 30	 50	11	 2	 3	 50	 	12	 2	 3	 10	 10	13	 2	 2.5	 10	 20	14	 2	 4	 40	 70	15	 3	 3	 40	 50	16	 2	 3	 50	 80	17	 3	 4	 20	 40	18	 2	 4	 50	 70	19	 3	 3	 40	 70	20	 3	 3	 50	 	21	 3	 3	 30	 50	22	 3	 3	 50	 70	23	 4	 4	 50	 70	24	 2	 3	 70	 100	25	 1	 3	 30	 	26	 2	 4	 40	 70	27	 1	 3	 	 	28	 3	 4	 1	 10	29	 3	 4	 5	 10	30	 3	 3	 	 												 ID	 WTA1	 WTA2	 WTA3	 CATTLE	 ACRES	 EXPERIENCE	
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1	 30	 90	 100	 240	 1524	 48	2	 10	 20	 30	 1000	 9500	 45	3	 10	 40	 50	 1150	 12800	 20	4	 1	 5	 10	 300	 5760	 57	5	 30	 40	 50	 300	 1300	 40	6	 10	 50	 60	 500	 4800	 35	7	 40	 70	 80	 	 1020	 35	8	 40	 60	 70	 1878	 17280	 27	9	 10	 40	 50	 200	 800	 20	10	 20	 40	 50	 135	 500	 30	11	 40	 	 	 350	 2000	 15	12	 5	 10	 10	 110	 1100	 25	13	 5	 10	 20	 275	 1100	 27	14	 30	 60	 70	 80	 1600	 8	15	 30	 40	 50	 100	 640	 30	16	 40	 70	 80	 200	 4640	 45	17	 10	 30	 40	 300	 1680	 50	18	 40	 60	 70	 500	 3900	 50	19	 30	 60	 70	 150	 6000	 25	20	 40	 	 	 250	 3000	 30	21	 20	 40	 50	 275	 5100	 55	22	 40	 60	 70	 200	 2140	 37	23	 40	 60	 70	 140	 910	 24	24	 60	 90	 100	 500	 5000	 50	25	 20	 	 	 512	 5280	 18	26	 30	 60	 70	 350	 4000	 20	27	 	 	 	 400	 5500	 20	28	 1	 5	 10	 350	 7920	 5	29	 1	 5	 10	 210	 760	 15	30	 	 	 	 60	 1120	 48														 ID	 FORMER	GOV	 PLAN	TO	 PROGRAM_PARTICIPAT CATTLE_INCO
	107	
PASTURE	USER	 LEASE	 ION	 ME	1	 0	 0	 1	 5	2	 1	 0	 1	 5	3	 1	 1	 1	 5	4	 0	 0	 1	 5	5	 1	 0	 1	 2	6	 1	 1	 1	 5	7	 0	 0	 0	 2	8	 1	 1	 0	 3	9	 1	 1	 0	 4	10	 1	 1	 0	 1	11	 0	 0	 1	 3	12	 0	 0	 0	 2	13	 0	 0	 1	 5	14	 0	 0	 1	 2	15	 0	 0	 0	 2	16	 1	 1	 0	 1	17	 0	 0	 1	 5	18	 1	 0	 0	 5	19	 1	 0	 1	 1	20	 0	 0	 1	 5	21	 0	 0	 1	 4	22	 0	 1	 0	 3	23	 0	 0	 1	 1	24	 1	 1	 0	 4	25	 1	 1	 1	 5	26	 0	 0	 1	 4	27	 0	 0	 1	 5	28	 0	 0	 1	 2	29	 1	 1	 0	 3	30	 0	 0	 0	 2											
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ID	 NONFARM_INCOME	 PLAN_TO_FARM	 SUCCESSION_PLAN	 SURFACE_WATER	 AGE	1	 1	 	 1	 1	 5	2	 1	 	 1	 1	 4	3	 1	 15	 0	 1	 3	4	 1	 0	 1	 1	 5	5	 1	 25	 0	 1	 3	6	 1	 10	 1	 1	 4	7	 4	 10	 1	 1	 4	8	 1	 	 1	 1	 1	9	 1	 10	 1	 1	 5	10	 2	 10	 1	 1	 4	11	 2	 30	 1	 1	 2	12	 3	 	 0	 1	 1	13	 1	 	 0	 1	 3	14	 1	 30	 0	 1	 2	15	 4	 10	 0	 1	 4	16	 1	 	 1	 1	 5	17	 1	 5	 1	 1	 4	18	 1	 	 0	 1	 4	19	 1	 7	 1	 1	 4	20	 3	 20	 1	 1	 3	21	 1	 15	 1	 1	 4	22	 1	 15	 0	 1	 4	23	 1	 15	 1	 1	 4	24	 1	 20	 1	 1	 4	25	 1	 40	 0	 1	 2	26	 2	 40	 1	 1	 3	27	 1	 30	 0	 1	 3	28	 1	 40	 0	 1	 2	29	 1	 30	 1	 1	 2	30	 1	 5	 1	 1	 5												
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ID	 EDUC	 EDUC_BINARY	 MALE	 RM_NUMBER	 BROWN_SOIL	1	 3	 0	 1	 493	 0	2	 2	 0	 1	 250	 1	3	 4	 1	 1	 5	 1	4	 1	 0	 1	 39	 1	5	 4	 1	 1	 429	 0	6	 2	 0	 1	 228	 1	7	 4	 1	 1	 520	 0	8	 2	 0	 1	 26	 1	9	 2	 0	 1	 428	 0	10	 2	 0	 1	 428	 0	11	 5	 1	 0	 131	 1	12	 4	 1	 1	 61	 0	13	 3	 0	 1	 398	 0	14	 4	 1	 0	 430	 0	15	 4	 1	 1	 158	 1	16	 2	 0	 1	 347	 1	17	 2	 0	 1	 93	 0	18	 2	 0	 0	 165	 1	19	 4	 1	 0	 228	 1	20	 4	 1	 0	 131	 1	21	 4	 1	 1	 132	 1	22	 1	 0	 1	 398	 0	23	 4	 1	 1	 339	 0	24	 2	 0	 1	 378	 1	25	 4	 1	 0	 76	 1	26	 4	 1	 1	 Vermillion	River	(AB)	 0	27	 2	 0	 1	 8	 1	28	 5	 1	 0	 154	 1	29	 4	 1	 0	 Wetaskiwin	County	(AB)	 0	30	 2	 0	 0	 190	 1		
